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ABSTRACT
Research on memory and suggestibility in children continues to
demonstrate circumstances under which children may not give accurate accounts
of important events. In investigating and treating child sexual abuse, it is
important to determine what has happened. Statement Validity Assessment is a
witness credibility assessment technique developed by Udo Undeutsch which
focuses on the reality of individual statements. It involves a special open-ended
investigative interview, Criteria-Based Content Analysis, which searches for the
presence of characteristics which indicate that a statement is based on an
experienced event, and a Validity Checklist which examines alternate
hypotheses. This technique has been widely used in Germany since the 1950s,
and since the 1980s has been studied in North America. Many contemporary
SVA studies have significant limitations in generalizability to sexual abuse
assessment. These methodological problems include using adult statements,
using child statements of weak ecological validity, and inadequately trained
expert evaluators. In general, lay subjects are only 55%-65% accurate in
evaluating the truthfulness of children's statements. This suggests that a role for
SVA in the North American legal system might be to improve juror performance
with exposure to educational testimony about the general characteristics of a true
statement. To assess the potential benefits of such education, 333 undergraduates
xi

were asked to e valuate statements about an emotionally involving mock crime
children had witnessed (ages six to ten). Statements were evaluated in
videotaped and written form. Prior to evaluation, one-third of subjects received
exposure to a videotape of a courtroom-style expert testimony about SVA and
CBCA. One-third of subjects received exposure to a counter-CBCA testimony
designed to test the effectiveness of the experimental manipulation, fhe
remaining subjects received no testimony exposure. Results indicated that
exposure to SVA testimony does not help lay evaluators, who averaged 65%
correct. Subjects were less accurate with videotapes than transcripts. These
results contrast with expert application of CBCA, which correctly classified 89%
of statements. SVA offers powerful tools for the investigation and assessment of
sexual abuse. Expert application of CBCA is strongly confirming of truthful
statements, which suggests the appropriateness of admitting testimony on the
validity of a specific statement.

Xll

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Statement Validity Assessment (SVA) is a technique to determine the
truthfulness of a child's allegations of sexual abuse (Undeutsch, 1989). It involves
a number of components, including an assessment of motivation and an openended interview of the child. The core of this approach is Criteria-Based Content
Analysis (CBCA), a technique that focuses on assessing the truthfulness of the
statement made by a child during the SVA interview. While commonly used in
Germany in sexual abuse cases (Steller & Kohnken, 1989), this approach is
relatively new in the United States (Raskin & Esplin, 1992a). Experimental
research on SVA has only recently been undertaken (Honts, 1994; Hunts, Devitt,
Tye, Peters, & Vonaergeest, 1995). This dissertation examines the history of
children's allegations of sexual abuse and considers how SVA fits with theories
of children's memories, determines experimentally whether brief exposure to
SVA can improve the ability of lay subjects to evaluate children's statements, and
considers these results in the context of the U.S. system of jurisprudence.

f In the United States this technique is currently referred to as Statement Validity Assessment by
some authors, and Statement Validity Analysis by others. Statement Validity Assessment is
used here.

1

2
Historical Treatment of Child Allegations of Sexual Abuse
When there is an allegation of child sexual abuse, three immediate
concerns come to mind: protecting the child and other children so that future
abuse does not occur, treating the psychological trauma resulting from the abuse,
and punishing the perpetrator. For many theorists, treating the victim has little
to do with punishing the abuser, nor is it necessary to prove that abuse occurred
before being able to proceed with treatment. Indeed, the process of proving the
abuser's guilt may be exceedingly traumatic to the victim. It may be possible to
mediate this trauma by special procedures in courtrooms, such as using video
taped testimony rather than allowing in-court cross-examination (Bulkley, 1992).
In any event, if society does choose to punish offenders, the determination of
guilt is intimately tied with assessing the credibility of the child's accusation.
This question of credibility is addressed in more detail below.
The issue of child sexual abuse has been drawing increasing public
attention and professional activity over the last few years (deYoung, 1992).
Reports of abuse have been increasing rapidly (Raskin & Yuilie, 1989), and ideas
about abuse have changed over the years. A few decades ago, the public
perception of a perpetrator was an image of an older predatory homosexual
male, abducting defenseless children from playgrounds (Newton, 1992). National
media attention has broadened publicly available examples of perpetrators to
include almost anyone: for example, mothers, priests, day care providers, and
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even estranged celebrity fathers engaged in protracted custodial battles. There is
also a popular movement whereby psychologically troubled adults, who have no
recollections of abuse, can "recover" their allegedly repressed memories of abuse
by participating in special therapy groups (Safran, 1993). With this focus on the
past and the apparently increasing frequency of parents using false accusations
of abuse to strengthen custody cases, there is the danger that real and current
abuse will be overlooked.
For abusers to be prosecuted, it is first necessary that people be willing to

consider that sexual abuse may occur. The current societal and judicial climate is
clearly one in which the possibility of abuse is readily accepted. However,
Western society has not always been so open to the suggestion that some adults
engage in forced sexual contact with children (Wasserman & Rosenfeld, 1992). In
the mid-19th century medical and legal authorities almost universally regarded
children's allegations of sexual abuse as false. When presented with physical
evidence of vaginal or rectal trauma in children, authorities went so far as to
describe the child's injuries as self-inflicted with the intention of harming the
reputation of the accused adult (deYoung, 1992).
For a brief period in the 1860s, things started to change. The dean of legal
medicine at the University of Paris, Ambroise August Tardieu, conducted courtordered medical examinations and autopsies ot children. He found evidence of
sexual abuse that he concluded could not have been self-inflicted. Further, in
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children whom he interviewed, he found evidence of emotional pain which he
concluded was unrelated to any prospect of material gain. He concluded that the
majority of allegations of sexual abuse made by children, including very young
children, were true and could be backed up by medical evidence (deYoung,
1992). In the 1880s, the chair of legal medicine at the University of Lyons,
Alexandre Lacasagne, investigated with student assistants hundreds of
allegations of sexual abuse, and concluded that a child could be systematically
abused without any physical trace (deYoung, 1992). Lacasagne had argued for
identifying abuse victims on the basis of psychological interviews—on children's
testimony alone.
Despite the work of Tardieu, in 1880 Alfred Fournier, an outspoken
skeptic of abuse, addressed the French Academy of Medicine urging physicians
to regard all uncorroborated allegations of abuse as symptoms of Pseudologia
phantastica—pathological fantasy (deYoung, 1992). Notwithstanding Lacasagne's
subsequent research, this view came to be widely accepted by the medical
community, and also affected the emerging field of psychoanalysis.
Freud's initial conceptualization of his patients' neuroses took their selfreports of childhood abuse as fact. At the time he started to introduce his theory
to colleagues, the medical community was almost totally convinced that
respectable affluent males would never sexually abuse their daughters. Had
Freud maintained his theory, he may well have been debunked as a quack.
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Perhaps diplomatically, he quickly abandoned his seduction theory and later
postulated the Oedipal Complex, and promoted the explanation that children
fantasize sexual contact between themselves and parents of the opposite sex.
Freud concluded "that he could not distinguish between objective truth and
fiction among the repressed ideas that psychoanalysis brought to light"
(Wasserman & Rosenfeld, 1992, p. 63). In the absence of confirming evidence,
Freud chose a theory safely consistent with the prevailing notion of Pseudologia
phantastica. In contrast, it is easy for modern commentators to state that at least
some of Freud's adult patients may well have been experiencing body memories
from real sexual abuse they experienced as children (Wasserman & Rosenfeld,
1992).
Defining Abuse: Cross-Cultural Views on Sexual Contact with Children
An often overlooked cross-cultural perspective on the issue of adult
sexual contact with children should be introduced. Certain issues are raised here
which are often entirely overlooked in the literature. North Americans have been
accused by many of being insensitive to cultural diversity and moral relativism.
Accordingly, this section considers some of the issues of cultural relativism
concerning childhood sexuality.
Much research on sexual abuse focuses not on treating the victims, nor
even on isolating the perpetrators, but on punishing the perpetrators. deYoung
(1992) noted that an allegation of sexual abuse has a paradoxical quality: "The
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substantiation of its truth in any one case only engenders doubt that truth will be
found in any other. Certainty and skepticism are juxtaposed" (p. 256).
In light of this paradox, which reflects the historical disbelief in the
existence of abuse, the legal system should try to confine sexual abuse
prosecutions to clearly legitimate cases. Thus, what constitutes "legitimate"
abuse should be made explicit—and, in law, this is in fact the case. Similarly, one
should expect scientific researchers also to clearly define what they mean by
abuse. In the literature, however, this is frequently not the case. Many research
articles and even entire books use the term "sexual abuse" without ever defining
what acts they are including. For example, the age of consent varies widely in
different countries and an act that warrants clinical concern and criminal
penalties in one area, may in another area be regarded as innocuously consensual
(Davenport, 1992).
A related issue is the definition of normal behavior and the width of the
gray zone that separates healthy play from symptoms of abuse. For example, the
National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect (Faller, 1993) considers that sexual
arousal in a child is one diagnostic symptom of abuse—a statement in
contradiction to some understandings of the healthy development of human
sexuality. Kinsey, Pomeroy, and Martin (1948) and Kinsey, Pomeroy, Martin, and
Gebhard (1953) found it quite common for pre-adolescent boys and girls to have
engaged in erotic play with same-sex partners. Masturbation and orgasmic
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responsiveness were also noted in one-third to one-half of pre-adolescent
children. Assuming that coercion is absent, how many years must separate
participants in such activities before psychologists consider the behavior to be
abnormal or dysfunctional? Perhaps by better researching the normal
development of sexuality during childhood we can better understand those
people who as adults become fixated on children for sexual gratification.
In other species, Bixler (1992) observed that such sexual contacts between
sexually mature and sexually immature conspecifics are rare, even among non
human primates. He goes so far as to say that, with the exception of accidental
matings, humans are unique in having numerous adults who fruitlessly expend
sexual energy on the sexually immature— an activity which can have no
reproductive fitness in the Darwinian sense. In way of explanation for a variety
of unfit practices (in terms of reproductive fitness), Bixler proposes that, "[V]ery
probably, we alone understand the function of the sex act; we conceive of
conceiving" (p. 98). He also notes that animals are best fitted to the environments
in which they evolved, and that when removed, bizarre results may occur. He
suggests that just as animals in a zoo are in an environment for which they did
not evolve, modern humans live in industrialized societies that are radically
different from the multimale, multifemale hunter-gatherer groupings in which
most of our recent evolution occurred. Therefore, he argues it is perhaps not
surprising that in humans one sees a wide range of pathology and "unnatural"
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behaviors that cannot be explained from a sociobiological view (Bixler, 1992).
However, the use of sexual behaviors to establish dominance is readily observed
in many primates, and sexually immature members of a troupe may upon
maturity become mates of a dominant male (Box, 1984).
Davenport (1992) and Wasserman and Rosenfeld (1992) have detailed
adult-child sexual relations in non-industrial cultures. From a cross-cultural
perspective, when adult-child sexual relations occur, they are generally part of a
developmental stage which is outgrown, and not a fixation of sexual satisfaction
for adults. For example, the Sambia people of New Guinea take 7 to 10 year old
boys from their mothers, and place them in a special group for 10-15 years.
During this time, the boys perform daily fellatio on older males—the elders of
the Sambia teach that semen is absolutely vital and should be consumed daily
since the creation of biological maleness and the maintenance of masculinity
depend upon it. Thus, from middle childhood until puberty, boys perform
fellatio on older youths. As they reach puberty, they become the recipients of
fellatio performed by younger boys. At marriage (between 16-25 years of age),
they may still act as bisexuals. However, as soon as they become fathers, Sambia
males become exclusively heterosexual.
Sandfort (1992) took the highly controversial view that not ali adult-child
sexual contacts in Western society are harmful. He argued that sexual abuse
should be dearly defined as occurring only when there is force, or when a power
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differential exists. He stated that this is almost always the case when the victims
are under the age of 10, but cautions that sexual relations between adults and
adolescents should not necessarily be viewed as abusive unless this is the
conclusion of the adolescent. He cited research conducted in the Netherlands that
shows that many young adolescents (12-14) reported having sexual contact with
adults labeled as consensual by the adolescents themselves, and that these
children show no poorer psychosocial adjustment than like-aged cohorts who
have never had sex or have only had sex with same-aged peers. Sandfort
suggested that the absence of harmful sequelae is due to the fact that societal
attitudes about human sexuality are somewhat different in the Netherlands than
in the United States. Furthermore, he stated that sexual play and
experimentation are common in both early childhood and middle childhood.
One survey found that as many as 80% of six and seven year olds have been
found engaging in sex play with siblings or friends (Kolodny, cited in Rice, 1992).
Although our society tends to keep children in same-age peer groups, it may
well be natural for children of mixed ages to engage in sex play.
Sandfort also noted that some published studies of sexual abuse label
exposure in childhood to erotic magazines abuse. Sandfort argued that victims of
traumatic sexual abuse will suffer if the term itself is devalued by being broadly
applied. A single encompassing definition of abuse might yield incidence rates so
high that the possibility of sexual abuse may again come to be rejected by the
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general public (who might not take the time to investigate the definitions used in
such studies).
Present Pay Treatment of Child Allegations of Sexual Abuse
As Wegener remarked (1989), generally truthful persons may upon
occasion lie, and generally untruthful persons may have cause to tell the truth in
isolated cases. Thus, in a court of law, the focus should not be on the credibility
of a witness but on the credibility of a particular testimony. As discussed above,
the current era has seen a widespread professional acceptance that sexual abuse
can and does occur. This acceptance includes the spheres of medicine,
psychology, and law. However, we do not see the same universal acceptance of
the ability of children as a class to testify truthfully. For more than a century,
professionals have cast aspersions on the ability of any child to deliver a truthful
testimony. In the stronger, less politically correct language of 1883, physician
Paul Brouardel raised the following doubts about the truthfulness of a child's
allegation of sexual abuse:
One often speaks of the candor of children. Nothing is more false. Their
imagination likes to invent stories in which they are the hero. The child
comforts herself by telling herself fantasies which she knows are false on
every point.. . . This child, to whom one ordinarily paid only the most
minor attention, finds an audience that is willing to listen to her with a
certain solemnity and to take cognizance of the creations of her
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imagination. She grows in her own self esteem, she herself becomes a
personage, and nothing will get her to admit that she deceived her family
and the first people who questioned her. Her lie will be all the more
difficult to unmask since the child lies without troubling herself over the
improbabilities which one finds in her account, (cited in deYoung, 1992,
P- 257)
Wakefield and Underwager (1989)—researchers who also provide
treatment for victims and perpetrators, and testify in court cases in the United
States—raised this concern about the malleability of children's memories:
"Absent strong corroborating legal evidence or third-party witnesses, or without
an admission by the accused, admission into evidence by the court of children's
statements standing alone must be viewed with great caution" (p. 65). Although
the langu ~;e is couched in a hundred plus years of academic restraint and
gender inclusive phrasing, the idea is essentially the same as that expressed by
Brouardel: Children as a class cannot be trusted to tell the truth; no
unsubstantiated child allegation of abuse is to be believed
Not all contemporary authors condemn the unsupported testimony of all
children. Nevertheless, issues of the admissibility of child testimony remain
highly controversial. The issue is an important one, because, as Lacasagne noted
in the last century, often there is no substantiating physical evidence of abuse. If
society wishes to punish perpetrators of abuse, the legal system often must
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choose between believing the words of an adult and believing the words of a
child. Undeutsch (1989) reiterated that child sexual abuse is frequently
nonviolent and non-witnessed. He noted that it is usually committed by someone
known to the child, that there may be no emission of semen or other physical
evidence of sexual activity, that perpetrators are usually exceptionally careful to
ensure that their deviant acts will occur in privacy where no one will notice
(certainly where no adult witnesses will notice), and that perpetrators rarely
confess unless they are persuaded that others believe the child. Thus, it may well
be that in the majority of real cases of sexual abuse one must accept the
testimony of the child as legal evidence, or be unable to pursue the matter
further in the courts. Central to this decision is the question of the credibility of
children's testimonies. Before looking in depth at the testimony-focused
approach known as Criteria-Based Content Analysis, this chapter concludes by
reviewing the issues and debates in the body of literature on suggestibility, and
describing recent trends about the importance of individual differences and
developmental models of memory.
Prevailing Paradigm: Suggestibility and Memory
While the central legal issue in many individual cases of abuse is a
particular child's testimony, the majority of research into the credibility of
children's testimony has focused on the child as witness per se, rather than on
the testimony of individual children. As noted above, this paradigm has strong

13
historical roots. It continues to dominate the present day research, and as yet
there is little consensus as to the extent of children's suggestibility (Ceci & Brack,
1995).
Basic assumptions about the nature of children vary widely. At one end
are those who would cast doubt on every child's testimony— who regard
children as a whole as "mentally vulnerable" individuals who hold "precariously
accessible memories" (Tully & Tam, 1987, p. 187). Goodman and Clarke-Stewart
(1992) represent the other end of the continuum—a qualified endorsement that
most children will tell the truth, even in the face of leading interviews. In their
review of a series of studies on suggestibility, they wrote the following
conclusion:
If these results can be generalized to investigations of abuse, they suggest
that normal children are unlikely to make up details of sexual acts when
nothing abusive happened. They suggest that children will not easily yield
to an interviewer's suggestion that something sexual occurred when in
fact it did not, especially if non-intimidating interviewers ask questions
children can comprehend. However, leading questions in these studies
also resulted in a small number of children making errors that could be
misinterpreted as suggesting that abuse had occurred, (p. 103)
Goodman and Clarke-Stewart (1992) presented a series of studies which
show varying rates of suggestibility in young children. They found that young
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children (3- and 4-years-old) are more likely to falsely report abuse when asked
questions such as "She touched your bottom, didn't she?" if the interviewer was
emotionally neutral. With a friendly interviewer, fewer errors were made. They
also found that the presence of anatomically correct dolls did not affect the
accuracy rates of both 3-year-old and 5-year-old children, and that some 3-yearold children answering affirmatively to the question "Did he touch your private
parts?" were in fact referring to non-private places, such as their ears or arms.
Despite the fact that one child falsely affirmed that she had been given a bath,
five children falsely agreed that they had been hugged and kissed by the
confederate, and two children falsely said "yes" when asked if their picture had
been taken in the bathtub, they concluded that young children have high
resistance to suggestibility. Other studies presented in the same paper follow a
similar pattern: a minority of children make alarming false allegations after an
innocuous manipulation. Goodman and Clarke-Stewart (1992) gave this
conclusion about the effects of counter-experiential leading interviews on
responses to factual questions in a large study:
Overall, the children who heard a biased interpretation inconsistent with
what they had observed answered as many of the 17 standard factual
questions correctly as the children who heard a neutral or a consistent
interpretation. A handful of children (about one fifth [sic] of the sample),

ographic images on this film are accurate reproductions of records delivered to Modern Information Systems for microfiIminn =>~i
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however, consistently made errors that were in the direction suggested by
the biased interpretation, (p. 101)
On the above, Steller (19921 commented , "Goodman and Clarke-Stewart seem to
have ignored their own findings" (p. 108). Goodman's position has changed in
recent years. Goodman's team later acknowledged the role of individual
differences, and clearly indicated that there are circumstances under which a
large proportion of children may be misled (Steward, Bussey, Goodman &
Saywitz, 1993).
Many researchers continue to ask the question, "Can children's testimony
be contaminated by suggestion?" Ceci, Ross, and Toglia (1987), Doris (1992), Ceci
and Bruck (1993), and Lamb, Sternberg, and Esplin (1994) all suggested that the
answer is "Perhaps." These authors independently have come to the conclusion
that a more productive direction for future work is to elaborate the particular
variables that influence accurate recall.
In a series of studies examining this question, Brainerd and Reyna (1995)
have shown that children's recall of events is susceptible to what they refer as
"gist" intrusions. They demonstrate that children's semantic memory appears to
be stored separately from their global perceptions about an experience, and that
the latter will interfere with recall. However, this interference does not appear to
be an encoding problem, since with appropriate probes that supply cues to the
content or verbatim memories, children's accurate recall returns. They find that
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this gist interference is much smaller with eight year olds than with five year
olds.
The ecological validity of the personal relevance of laboratory research on
memory has been questioned by Goodman & Clarke-Stewart (1992), particularly
with regards to generalizing to incidents of sexual abuse. Hembrooke and Ceci
(1995) presented evidence both affirmative and negative to the question about
whether a unique mechanism such as dissociation exists for traumatic memory in
children. There are those who claim that older children and even adults can
recall memory’ of abuse events that occurred before language skills were fully
acquired (Ceci & Bruck, 1995). It should be noted that Tessler and Nelson (1994)
showed that the parental use of language during an experience greatly affected
the ability of younger children (three year olds) to have accurate recall. They
argued that autobiographical memory development and language are
inextricably bound together, and that autobiographical memory would be
impossible before language has been acquired.
Recent research seems to be acknowledging the quagmire represented by
the advocacy paradigm which seeks to prove that children's recall of serious
events is (or is not) impervious to tampering. This new direction acknowledges
that a combination of individual differences in development and the
characteristics of a situation combine to affect recall. Even more promising is a
new focus on the what sort of recall techniques may enhance recall.
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Poole (1995a,b) found that after delay, children are more likely to give erroneous
information under conditions of free recall. The overall amount of detail—both
accurate as well as inaccurate—was greatest under free recall. However, the
events the children were her situations were not personally relevant and she
suggested that her subjects may not have attended closely to the situation when
it was occurring. An interesting analogy is to be found in the persuasive
communications literature. The Elaboration Likelihood Model of communication
advanced by psychophysiologists and social psychologists Petty and Cacioppo
(1986) supports that attention is key to deep processing of information.
The present author suggests that the paradigm that focuses on the various
influences on recall is of only limited utility. To almost every question about
suggestibility this research paradigm has generated the answer "Maybe, maybe
not." For example, there is tremendous controversy about the use of
anatomically detailed dolls (Ceci & Bruck, 1995). Under some circumstances and
with some children their use enhances recall, and with conditions in the same
experiment, it impairs recall (e.g., Gordon et al., 1993; Ornstein, Follmer, &
Gordon, 1995). Clinicians making assessments are always working with an
assessment of an individual, and the accuracy of the assessment rests upon a
determination of the validity of an individual allegation—a particular statement.
Thus, statements should be a primary concern for researchers, and it is for that
reason that the focus of the present research is on statements.
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It is possible that a suggestible child may be abused, and so a research base
which speaks to the conditions under which children's testimony can be
contaminated is not necessarily diagnostic of whether a particular testimony is
accurate or not, even if this research is ultimately able to produce a measure of a
particular child's suggestibility. There is in fact such a technique which has as its
theoretical underpinnings the hypothesis that recollections that are based on
memories of experienced events will differ in quantifiable, detectable ways from
recollections that are not based on memories of experienced events. Such a
statement-based approach ties in well with the recent work on the development
of a narrative memory.
Before at last turning to this promising statement-based assessment
approach, it may be helpful to present the prevailing standard for assessing
allegations of child sexual abuse in the United States, as advocated by the federal
government (see Table 1). This standard relies on three categories of information:
a description of the abuse, information about the context of the abuse, and an
emotional reaction consistent with the abuse being described.
Some authors (e.g., Saunders, 1991) have argued that therapists should
believe an allegation of abuse and treat it as true, and that only legal
investigators should be concerned with the factual basis of such a recollection.
However, White (1991, 1993) has argued that appropriate treatment depends
upon accurate assessment. The need for accurate reality-determining assessment
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Table Is National Center for Child Abuse and Neglect Criteria
The following criteria are given by the National Center for Child Abuse and Neglect (NCCAN)
for assessing a child's statements (or behavior) for evidence of sexual abuse (Faller, 1993,
p. 54-55):
A Description of the Sexual Abuse:
*> '

>-'

sexual knowledge beyond that expected for the child's developmental stage;
an account consistent with a child's perspective; and
an explicit description of the sexual acts.

Information About the Context o f the Sexual Abuse:
*■

>
>
>
> '

>>

>
>>
>>
>
>■
>

where it happened;
when it happened;
where other people in the family were;
what the offender might have said to involve the child;
what the victim and offender were wearing and what clothing was removed;
the frequency an d /o r duration of the abuse;
whether the offender said anything about telling or not telling;
if so, whom did the child tell and that person's response.

reluctance to disclose: characteristic of most children except possibly for very disturbed or
very young children;
embarrassment: a rather mild response often found in disturbed and young children;
anger: more characteristic of boy victims (but not always evident);
anxiety: noted frequently in adolescent girls;
disgust: a typical reaction to oral sex;
depression: often present in victims who care for the abuser or feel they are responsible;
fear: typical of cases in which the child has been injured or threatened during the course of
the victimization; and
sexual arousal: another response sometimes found in disturbed and young children

NCCAN also indicates that as many as a third of all accounts may be absent one or more of the
categories of criteria.

grows all the more persuasive given that the estimates of false allegations vary
widely, from less than 3% in general to as much as 75% in certain circumstances
such as custody disputes (Quinn, 1988). The generality of the NCCAN criteria
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limit their use in such an assessment—it is a system presented without empirical
evidence, whose criteria are not said to be uniquely present in true statements
and absent from false ones. Prevailing assessment techniques such as
anatomically detailed dolls are often sharply limited, as Lamb (1994) has noted.
Medical evidence is often absent even in children who have been subjected to
repeated abuse, and behavioral indicators such as sexualized behavior are
frequently present in non-abused children and absent in those who are victims of
abuse (Larnb, 1994). A reliable assessment technique that could differentiate true
and false statements would benefit not only the legal community but also the
therapeutic community, and, from all perspectives, the child.
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CHAPTER II
STATEMENT VALIDITY ASSESSMENT
AND CRITERIA-BASED CONTENT ANALYSIS
Hereafter, when a statement is referred to as “true/' it will mean based on
memory of experienced events, and when referred to as "false," it will mean not
based on memory of experienced events. From a treatment standpoint, there is
an important difference between willful deceit and misbelief (fantasy). However,
a broader question for assessment (and the only question for a legal proceeding
in which someone stands accused of abuse) is whether the child's allegation was
essentially based on the memory of an experienced event, and unless specified
otherwise false will be used to refer to statements that are either deceitful or the
product of fantasy.
History of Statement Validity Assessment
The idea of scientifically analyzing statements can be traced to turn of the
century Germany, and the work of William Stern (Undeuisch, 1989). Stern
conducted research with adult and child subjects on memory and recall, finding
that perfect recall was rare. Stern himself realized the relevance of his research
for cases of sexual abuse. The testimony of psychological experts was not,
however, readily admissible in German courts. Later, after the second world war,
the German judicial system was revamped, and special courts were set up for
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offenses committed by or against persons under 21 years of age. In 1954, Udo
Undeutsch and a handful of other experts were called by the Supreme Court of
the Federal Republic of Germany to consult in a case of adults who had raped a
14 year old girl. The defendants admitted to having had sex with the girl, but
denied that the intercourse was forced. Undeutsch questioned the girl and tape
recorded his interview. He later replayed the tape in front of the justices,
including those sections in which the girl admitted to exaggerating her story. In
Undeutsch's words (1989):
The five Justices of the Senate were impressed by the demonstration and
convinced themselves that in assessing the truthfulness of the testimony of
a child or juvenile witness an expert psychologist conducting and out-ofcourt examination has "other and better resources" than the persons
acting as fact finders within the formal atmosphere of a courtroom trial.
(p. 104)
Thereafter, it was common practice for the German courts to summon
experts to assist in ascertaining the truth (Kohnken & Steller, 1988; Undeutsch,
1989). The German legal system for trying such cases is not adversarial—there is
no jury, and no motivation for a defense and a prosecution to call in "competing"
experts. The cases are tried by a panel of judges. The number of judges varies
according to the severity of the penalty associated with the alleged offense
(Wegener, 1989). It may consist of one judge, one judge and two lay judges, or
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three judges and two lay judges. These lay judges hear many similar cases. In this
system, it is easy to see how the courts would be willing to consider and even
rely upon the assessments of trusted experts. The ethos of the Anglo-American
adversarial criminal justice system is not to present neutral unbiased
assessments— rather, it is to present two diametrically opposed viewpoints, a
forum for them to "duke it out," and a jury to decide who wins. The jury in the
Anglo-American system is not expert, but is almost deliberately naive, lacking in
any prior convictions, and the judges are mere referees. A more affluent
defendant may conceivably hire more experts and create more doubt in the mind
of a jury. In the German system, the people hearing the arguments already
possess expertise about the type of case they are considering, and so logically
would be better able to evaluate the quality of expert testimony. By extension,
the ability of an economically powerful defense to overwhelm the government's
case by drawing in a bewildering plethora of experts would be diminished. On
the other hand, the state has more possibility to overwhelm a defendant in
Germany than in the U.S., where it is only less affluent defendants who must rely
on the patronage of the state for their defense.
Undeutsch has personally been an expert witness in over 1500 cases of
child sexual abuse (Boychuk, 1991) and, based on his experience, has argued that
he has little respect for the utility of laboratory research in the assessment of
credibility. His chief complaint against experimental research is that child sexual
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abuse is so vastly different an experience from those that can ethically be created
in the laboratory, that there is zero generalizability. Instead, he has developed
and refined, through decades of experience, "methods for assessing the truth
value of statements" (Undeutsch, 1989, p. 107). Undeutsch has strongly
discounted the value of assessing the personality of a witness, or issues related to
trustworthiness of witnesses in general. As he said,
To cut a long story short: I have experienced a number of cases in which
the witness had all or many of the personality traits that were, according
to the traditional rules, considered to be very unfavorable for the chances
to obtain a correct and truthful report from this p erson .. . . Yet in some of
these cases during the trial the accused confessed to the crime as charged.
(1989, p. 109.)
Undeutsch has focused on assessing the truthfulness of a testimonial statement.
He originally referred to his approach as Statement Reality Analysis (SRA). The
first English language publication on SRA dates to 1972 (Trankell, 1972).
However, journal articles in English on the technique do not appear until the
1980s. SRA included a psychological assessment (gathering background details),
a forensic assessment (the interview with the child), and a credibility assessment
of the testimony performed according to criteria developed by Undeutsch,
Arntzan, Trankell, and Szewczyk (Undeutsch, 1989).
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The basic idea of this content analysis is that a child's truthful statement
will be different in structure and content from a made up story, and that these
differences will be detectable by a blind observer rating a transcript of the child's
statement (Boychuk, 1991). Steller (1989) has referred to this as the Undeutsch
Hypothesis. Undeutsch proposed that a false statement will likely proceed from
beginning to end, with few interruptions, few digressions, and few extraneous
details. Children recollecting events that happened to them would, however,
tend to jump around in time as they remembered various pieces. Furthermore,
there should be a richness of extraneous details to true statements— details not
related directly to the accusation. The statement in its entirety would still be
logically consistent. The Undeutsch Hypothesis indicates that in children, both
willful lies and genuinely believed-in fantasies will be characterized by the same
absence of characteristics that will be present only in a statement based on
memories of experienced events. Undeutsch does not propose a method for
differentiating a lie from a believed-in fantasy.
Steller and Kohnken (Steller, 1989; Steller & Kohnken, 1989) have taken
the SRA concepts developed by Undeutsch and others and refined them. The
term Statement Reality Analysis has been replaced by Statement Validity
Assessment, and the actual assessment of the testimony has come to be formally
referred to as Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA). Steller, Raskin, Yuille,
arid Esplin have further codified CBCA. into 19 criteria for analyzing witnesses'
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statements. Many of these criteria are the same as used by Undeutsch (Steller,
1989; Raskin & Yuille, 1989; Raskin and Esplin, 1992a), with minor vocabulary
changes to make the meaning of terms more self-evident.
Current Form of SV A
Table 2 outlines the three main components of Statement Validity
Assessment. SVA begins with an interview designed to maintain objectivity on
the part of the interviewer and also maximize the amount of information
gathered. Great care is taken in an SVA interview not to ask leading questions
(and thus to avoid altogether issues of suggestibility), and the interview must be
recorded, preferably on videotape. This technique is similar to the type of
"special care questioning programme" adopted by the Hong Kong police (Tully
& Tam, 1987). This is also consistent with the technique of Vogeltanz and
Drabman (1995) who emphasized the importance of reducing contamination by
the use of a two-person interview team where one interviewer has no knowledge
of the details of a case.
Currently in the U.S., many front-line social service investigators have
considerable knowledge about the details of an allegation, prefer to use
anatomically correct dolls in their interviews, and are resistant to using openended interview techniques because they feel that children will be unwilling or
unable to communicate what has happened to them if other investigative
techniques are used (Ceci & Bruck, 1995). However, healthy, non-abused
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Table 2: Three Components of SVA

>
>
>

Statement Validity Assessment Interview
Criteria-Based Content Analysis of statement
Validity Checklist

children may often play with such dolls in ways that arouse suspicions. As
Gabriel wrote, if an examiner is biased and goes on "a fishing expedition" with
such dolls, abuse will likely be found (cited in Wakefield and Underwager, 1989,
p. 59). This is especially dangerous when the interviewer shuns videotaping, and
the manner in which the allegation was elicited cannot be proven. Klitzing (1990)
gave examples of cases of known abuse (where medical evidence existed) in
which the family, out of shame, told the child to be quiet, and the police could
not at first get any testimony from the child. This sort of situation presents
difficulty for any interviewing or credibility assessment technique. While SVA
presupposes that a child is willing to make a statement, it provides as an integral
part of the interview a period of rapport building to facilitate disclosure.
At the conclusion of the open-ended SVA interview, the interviewer may
conduct a testing of limits in which the suggestibility of the child is assessed by
seeing if the child will agree to saying that something happened counter to the
child's previous statement. The statement is then transcribed and analyzed for
the presence of criteria. SVA concludes with a validity assessment procedure in
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which the child's verbal and cognitive abilities are assessed, as well as the
presence of any motivational factors for making a false accusation. This "validity
checklist" tests the plausibility of various alternative hypotheses explaining the
child's accusation, and is used by the interviewer, in conjunction with the CBCA
results, to make a final determination about the truthfulness of the testimony
(Raskin & Esplin, 1991). Little research has been performed on the validity
checklist, and the literature does not clearly specify what weight the validity
checklist should be given in the final SVA decision (Raskin & Esplin, 1991;
Raskin & Esplin, 1992a; Horowitz, 1991). Table 3 lists the content criteria and
Table 4 gives the v alidity checklist.
Nevertheless, the core of SVA— and the largest component of the final
judgment about the truthfulness of a testimony—is the criteria-based content
analysis of the child's statement (Raskin & Esplin, 1991). The generic term
"credibility examination" is used by some researchers to refer to an expert's
assessment of the psychodynamic motivations for why the child may, or may
not, be telling the truth (e.g., Klitzing, 1990). CBCA is a very different technique
for assessing credibility. It strives to be a purely objective assessment of the
logical structure and content of the child's testimony. In practice, it is somewhat
subjective as interpretations must be made. Thus, a short statement would
necessarily have difficulty fulfilling a number of criteria because of its brevity.
The evaluator must determine whether this indicates a fabrication, or some other
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Table 3: CBCA Criteria

'Hie following criteria are given by Raskin and Esplin (1992a, p. 156-157):
Criteria for Analyzing General Characteristics
1.

Logical structure. Is the statement coherent? Is the content logical? Do the
different segments fit together? (Note: Peculiar or unique details or
unexpected complications do not diminish logical structure.)

2.

Unstructured production. Are the descriptions unconstrained? Is the report
somewhat unorganized? Are there digressions or spontaneous shifts of
focus? Are some elements distributed throughout? (Note: This criterion
requires that the account is logically consistent.)

3.

Quantity of details. Are there specific descriptions of place or time? Are
persons, objects, and events specifically described? (Note: Repetitions are
not counted.)
Criteria for Analyzing Specific Contents

4.

Contextual embedding. Are events placed in spatial and temporal context?
Is the action connected to other incidental events, such as routine daily
occurrences?

5.

Descriptions of interactions. Are there reports of actions and reactions or
conversation? (Note: Verbatim reproduction of conversation is also scored
under criterion 6.)

6.

Reproduction of conversation. Is conversation reported in its original form?
(Note: Use of unfamiliar terms or quotes are especially strong indicators,
even when attributed to only one participant.)

7.

Unexpected complications during the incident. Was there an unplanned
interruption or an unexpected complication or difficulty?
Criteria for Analyzing Peculiarities of Content

8.

Unusual details. Are there details of persons, objects, or events that are
unusual, yet meaningful in this context? (Note: Unusual details must be
realistic.)
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9.

Superfluous details. Are peripheral details reported that are related to the
situation but that do not contribute directly to the allegation?

10.

Accurately reported details misunderstood. Did the child correctly describe
an object or event but interpret it incorrectly?

11.

Related external associations. Is there reference to an event or conversation
of a sexual nature that is related in some way to the incident but that did not
occur within the incident?

12.

Accounts of subjective mental state. Did the child describe feelings or
thoughts experienced at the time of the incident?

13.

Attribution of perpetrator's mental state. Is there reference to the alleged
perpetrator's feelings or thoughts during the incident?
Criteria for Analyzing Content Related to Motivation

14.

Spontaneous corrections. Were corrections offered or information added to
material previously provided in the statement? (Note: Responses to direct
questions do not qualify.)

15.

Admitting lack of memory. Did the child indicate lack of memory or
knowledge of an aspect of the incident?

16.

Raising doubts about one's own testimony. Did the child express concern
that some part of the statement seems incorrect or unbelievable? (Note:
Merely asserting that one is telling the truth does not qualify.)

17.

Self-deprecation. Did the child describe some aspect of his or her behavior
related to the incident as being wrong or inappropriate?

18.

Pardoning the perpetrator. Did the child make excuses for the alleged
perpetrator or fail to blame the alleged perpetrator when an opportunity
occurred?
Criteria for Analyzing Offense-Specific Elements of Content

19.

Details characteristic of the offense. Are there elements that are common to
this type of offense? (Note: Details contrary to common knowledge are
especially strong indicators.)
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Table 4: Validity Checklist

The following checklist is given by Raskin and Esplin (1991, p. 288):

Psychological Characteristics
1.

Cognitive-emotional limitations. Are there indications that limited
cognitive abilities, unwillingness to discuss the events, or discomfort during
the interview interfered with obtaining adequate information from the
interview process?

2.

Language and knowledge. Was the child's use of language and display of
knowledge beyond the normal capacity for a child of that age and experience
and beyond what the child may have learned from the incident?

3.

Affect during the intr -ew. Did the child display inappropriate affect
during the interview
.. as there an absence of affect that would be
expected to accompany such a report by this child?

4.

Suggestibility. Did the child demonstrate susceptibility to suggestion or ask
questions during the interview to attempt to obtain clues as to what to say to
the interviewer?
Interview Characteristics

5.

Interview procedures. Was this interview inadequate according to principles
and procedures of statement validity assessment? Did the interviewer
introduce distractions, fail to establish rapport, inadequately attempt to elicit
a free narrative, fail to use open questions and appropriate follow-up
questions, or fail to attempt to resolve ambiguities and apparent
inconsistencies? Were reasonable alternative hypotheses ignored?

6.

Influence on statement contents. Was there leading or suggestive
questioning, pressure, or coercion in any analyzed interview of the child?
Were suggestive techniques or props employed in any interview?
Motivational Factors

7.

Motives for reporting. Does the child's relationship to the accused or other
contextual variables (e.g., living arrangements or relationships among
significant others) suggest possible motives for the child to make a false
allegation?
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8.

Context of disclosures. Are there questionable elements in the context of the
original disclosure or report of the accusations? Are there important
inconsistencies in the reports?

9.

Influence by others. Are there indications that others suggested, coached,
pressured, or coerced the child to make a false report?
Investigative Questions

10.

Lack of realism. Are the described events unrealistic? Are there major
elements in the state ment that are contrary to the laws of nature?

11.

Inconsistent statements. Are there major elements in the statement (not
peripheral details) that are inconsistent or contradicted by another statement
made by this child or another witness?

12.

Contradictory evidence. Are there major elements in the statement that are
contradicted by reliable physical evidence or other concrete evidence?

13.

Characteristics of the offense. Is the description of the alleged sexual offense
lacking in the normal details and general characteristics of this type of
offense against a child? Does the description contain important elements or
general characteristics that are contrary to what has been established in the
professional and investigative literature concerning such offenses?

factor, such as a child with poor verbal abilities. CBCA looks at the testimony
itself, and not at family dynamics or other reasons for why a false allegation may
be made.
The 19 content criteria shown in Table 3 are quite clearly defined and
represent the "state of the art" circa 1996. These criteria also represent CBCA as
researched throughout the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s in North
America. There is however no single CBCA. As Raskin and Esplin (1992a) point
out, the criteria are evolving. The earliest English language text on statement
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assessment is TrankelJ's Reliability o f Evidence (1972). This volume presents an
early form of the present criteria. In addition to semantic and conceptual
differences in various authors' presentations of the criteria, no one has accepted a
standardized scoring system. Sometimes a two-point scale is used: 0 for absent, 1
for present. Sometimes a three-point scale is used: 0 for absent, 1 for weakly
present, and 2 for strongly present. Furthermore, Undeutsch, Raskin, Esplin, and
Yuille fail to provide guidelines for what CBCA score is needed to indicate with
confidence that a statement is truthful, and what score would cast doubt on the
credibility of a statement. There seems to be little consensus as to a clear cut off.
Yuille (cited in Joffe, 1992/1994) once required the presence of the first five
criteria and any two of the others to classify a statement as truthful. Raskin,
Esplin, and Craig (1995) recently suggested using a continuum in which more
criteria lend increasing support to the hypothesis that a statement is true. The
English language literature does not clearly indicate whether contemporary
German investigators use a uniform system or if there are regional or individual
differences in CBCA and its application.
Kohnken, Schimossek, Aschermann, and Hofer (1995) have proposed six
additional content criteria supportive of a true statement: an issue-related
reporting style (versus a long-winded style), the display of insecurities,
providing reasons for lack of memory, less use of cliches, fewer repetitions, and
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more comments and interpretations regarding the event. These 'Kohnken
criteria" reportedly increased the classification performance of unaided CBCA.
SVA and CBCA Research
The theory underlying CBCA, that a false statement will differ
qualitatively from a true statement, is now referred to as the Undeutsch
Hypothesis. Udo Undeutsch himself did not like to do research. He felt that
laboratory experiments were of little benefit for developing statement
assessment (Undeutsch, 1989):
The growing experience with the testimony in criminal proceedings made
it obvious that the laboratory experiences on eyewitness memory bore
little resemblance with the situation of a victim-witness of a sex crime and,
as a consequence, the results of these experiments have very little bearing
on the court room situation, (p. 105)
Undeutsch instead relied on his own extensive use of the technique as
evidence of its effectiveness. Of some 1500 testimonies that he had personally
assessed, he determined 90% to be truthful, and of these, 95% led to a conviction.
In support of the remarkable effectiveness of the technique, he noted that from
among all these convictions (approximately 1280), not a single defendant was
later found innocent by the discovery of additional, conflicting information. In
support further of his confidence in the efficacy of the technique, he stated that
over the course of three decades, in many thousands of cases that assessed by
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himself and others in Germany and Sweden, there have been no reports of later
evidence contradicting the facts contained in a child's testimony— when that
testimony had been deemed truthful by statement reality assessment (Steller &
Kohnken, 1989). Despite Undeutsch's confidence and this anecdotal record, the
widespread use of a technique should be preceded by empirical validation. The
growing body of such validating research is described below. For clarity, the
literature has been organized to present experiments by research methodology.
Statements Obtained from the Field
There are only a handful of U.S. studies of CBCA that use real statements
of sexual abuse. One, conducted by Raskin and Esplin (1992a) yielded very
encouraging results. It involved applying CBCA to 40 sexual abuse statements
made by children ranging from 3 to 15. Only cases in which the alleged abuser
was a friend or relative of the victim were used (cn the grounds that there is less
motivation to make false allegations involving strangers, therefore these stranger
cases would be less likely to contain untrue testimonies [Raskin & Esplin,
1992a]). The efficacy of CBCA was determined by dividing the rated statements
into two groups: doubtful statements, and confirmed statements. Confirmed
statements were defined as those in which either physical evidence or confessions
were present (14 cases had both physical evidence and full confessions). The
doubtful statements were defined as those in which there was judicial dismissal,
a subsequent recantation by the child, or a lack of prosecution. In 19 of the 20
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doubtful cases, there was no corroborating evidence, in the single case with
physical evidence the child later admitted to identifying the wrong perpetrator.
Additionally, truthful polygraphs results were obtained in 1.4 of the 20
“doubtful" cases (that is to say, corroborating the alleged perpetrators' denials,
and indicating that the children's testimonies were false). Each of the 19 CBCA
criteria were assigned a value of 0 if not present, 1 if present, or 2 if strongly
present. Scores were summed across all 19 criteria.
In this study, the CBCA scores for the two groups had no overlap
whatsoever, thus CBCA was able to discriminate true from false testimonies with
100% accuracy. Confirmed statements received scores between 16 and 34,
whereas doubtful statements received scores between 0 and 10 (significantly
different, t(38) = 16.53, p<.001). Most of the 19 criteria were present in a majority
of the confirmed statements, and absent from a majority of the doubtful
statements. Furthermore, seven of the 19 criteria were present in every confirmed
statement, and seven criteria were absent from all doubtful statements. However,
criteria 10,11, and 16 showed less ability to discriminate confirmed statements
from doubtful statements (respectively, these criteria are: accurately reported
details misunderstood, related external associations, raising doubts about one's
own testimony). They were present in less than 10% of the confirmed statements.
Also, two criteria (1 and 3, logical structure and quantity of details) were present

37
in more than half of the doubtful statements. No factor analysis or discriminant
analysis was conducted.
Wells and Loftus (1992) critiqued this study for circularity. They
suggested that the confirmed cases may have resulted in plea-bargained
confessions and convictions of innocent people because the children who made
the allegations gave very convincing testimony. They also suggested that,
hypothetically, the "doubtful" cases may have been real abuse, but that no
convictions occurred because the children in these cases were so unconvincing
(which might also account for their low CBCA scores). Raskin and Esplin (1992b)
countered that in the doubtful cases there was no medical evidence, and that a
majority of the alleged perpetrators passed a polygraph test. However,
polygraph test results were not given for the alleged perpetrators in the
confirmed group (the ones who were eventually convicted). This debate will
always characterize field studies, because the truth can never be known
absolutely, and there is always some overlap between the criteria used by the
present legal system to determine guilt, and the criteria used by CBCA.
Another field study was conducted by Boychuk (1991), using statements
from open-ended interviews that were audiotaped and videotaped in 1987 and
1988. The design was a similar one to Raskin and Esplin's study— testimonies
given in cases that had already been resolved were selected for post-hoc CBCA
analysis (Raskin and Esplin's field study, described above, was conducted prior

38
to Boychuk's even though it has a later publication date). Of 97 available
transcripts, 75 cases were chosen such that 25 fell into each of three groups:
Group A, a confession, clear medical evidence, and a conviction; Group B, a
confession and a conviction (no clear medical evidence); Group C, no confession,
a truthful polygraph outcome, no medical evidence, an expert opinion that abuse
probably did not occur, and judicial dismissal of the case. Thus, one third of the
cases were clearly confirmed, one third were strongly confirmed, and one third
were clearly doubtful. Whether the middle one third were confirmed or
somewhat doubtful depends upon one's point of view. Raskin and Esplin would
probably argue they were clearly confirmed, Wells and Loftus might argue that
confessions are sometimes made by the innocent in the course of plea
bargaining. Furthermore, abuse may occur with the absence of corroborating
medical evidence. Nevertheless, this study was a good field validation of CBCA,
particularly because of the strong, clearly designated category requirements for
Groups A and C.
Boychuk performed her analysis on the confirmed versus the highly
doubtful cases (thus combining Group A and Group B; these two groups were
not analyzed separately). Unfortunately, Boychuk only reported results for the
statistical significance of the presence or absence of each of the 19 criteria. She
did not assign a 0-1-2 weight to the criteria, and did not report criteria-summed
scores. She found that 12 of the 19 criteria were present more often In the
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confirmed group than in the highly doubtful group (p<.05), and that 8 of these 12
were present more often at the p<.001 level
A bootstrap reanalysis of fourteen criteria from this data set conducted by Raskin
and Honts (1994) revealed no overlap whatsoever in the sampling distribution of
the means, and a near-perfect classification performance, fable 5 summarizes the
presence of each criterion in Boychuk's data.
The presence or absence of criteria was affected by many factors,
including the age of children, the type of abuse, the recency of abuse, and the
number of times the child had been interviewed. She found that the type of
abuse significantly affected the presence of criterion 2 and criterion 11 (see Table
3). She also found that the number of times an interview was conducted affected
the presence of criteria 1, 2 ,3 ,5 , 9 ,1 4 , and 16. She had not expected to find the
presence of so many criteria susceptible to change after multiple interviews.
Consistent with other literature, Boychuk found that the recency of abuse
significantly affected the logical structure and quantity of details, as well as the
presence of criteria 2 ,4 ,1 1 ,1 4 , and 19. Age of child affected the frequency of
criterion 15's presence. Two criteria (13 and 17) were never met in the testimony
of children less than six years of age.
Brodie (1993) examined the effects of training CBCA and SVA on social
workers. She used a set of twelve transcripts of children's statements about abuse
(half deemed likely to be true, half deemed likely to be false). She had each of 53
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Table 5: Presence of Criteria in Boychuk/Raskin/Honts Data

Percent of statements with
criterion present

CRITERIA

Highly
Doubtful
(N=25)

Confirmed
(N=50)

General Characteristics
1

Logical structure

100%

*

68%

2

Unstructured production

100%

*

40%

3

Quantity of details

100%

*

48%

4

Contextual embedding

96%

X-

44%

1
I
t}

5

Descriptions of interactions

66%

X-

12%

:

6

Reproduction of speech

74%

X-

20%

7

Unexpected complications

64%

X-

8%

8

Unusual details

52%

X-

8%

9

Superfluous details

50%

x-x-

24%

10

Details misunderstood

12%

11

External associations

42%

X-

0%

12

Subjective experience

64%

X-

24%

13

Accused's mental state

10%

14

Spontaneous corrections

86%

X-

36%

65.4%

X-

24.0%

Specific Contents

Mean percent present (of 14):
Mean frequency of criteria:

9.2

Mean sum of criterion scores:

24.8

Notes:

i

I

* significantly different, p < .01

0%

4%

3.4

X-

3.6

’ ’ significantly different, p < .05

i

j;

|
iI

l

1
1
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county child protective service social workers evaluate two of the transcripts.
After seminar training in CBCA, each social worker evaluated another two
transcripts and then re-evaluated the first ones according to CBCA. Subjects
performed near-chance in both pre-seminar and post-seminar evaluations! The
only variable that impacted rater accuracy was the age of the child (they were
more accurate with younger children than older children). CBCA training did
not improve their performance, and it was found that they did not utilize the
statement of the child when reaching their decision— indicating a failing in the
subject's use of CBCA. Subject experience, gender of the child, and subject
knowledge of abuse did not relate to performance.
The only other U.S. study to use actual abuse statements examined the
issue of reliability of scoring. Anson, Golding, and Gully (1993) presented 23
videotapes of investigative interviews of confirmed child abuse victims (ranging
in age from 4.1 years to 12.9 years) to four trained CBCA evaluators. Each
testimony was evaluated by two of the four evaluators. They found a moderate
interrater reliability for CBCA criteria (mean Maxwell's RE coefficient = .49,
ranging from -.22 to 1.00 for individual criteria). The authors suggested several
possible reasons to account for the poor showing (at odds with reliability in the
high .70s and mid .80s reported by Boychuk, 1991): first, the average presence of
CBCA criteria was only 41% rather than 70% of the time (substantially less than
in other statements). More importantly, evaluators did not receive written
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transcripts but only saw videotapes. Perhaps this study demonstrates not that
CBCA scoring has low reliability, but the danger of departing from the
Undeutsch procedure. Interestingly, Anson et al. also found that age correlated
positively with presence of CBCA criteria.
As Wells and Loftus (1992) suggested, CBCA should ideally be assessed in
a study evaluating a large number of cases falling on a continuum of clearly
confirmed to clearly spurious, including many uncertain cases in the middle.
Nevertheless, as Doris (1994) argued, laboratory studies have the benefit of
identifying with no uncertainty which statements are really true, and which ones
are really false. For this reason they should be an indispensable part of the
validation of investigative techniques.
Statements Obtained from Laboratory Experiments
Raskin and Esplin (1992a) criticized studies such as Goodman's for a lack
of ecological validity, as they present the child with a situation far removed from
the dynamics of sexual abuse. They suggested results from that laboratory
research on statement assessment can be generalized to actual sexual abuse
investigations if the laboratory scenario possesses the following characteristics:
direct involvement of the witness, loss of control, and negative emotional tone.
Steller (1989) also emphasized the importance of these three standards for
generalizability of statement analysis research. One characteristic of sexual abuse
that is hardest to replicate in the laboratory is that the invasively negative event
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is often perpetrated by someone known to the child, and often the intensity of
the abuse increases incrementally over a considerable period of time (Steller &
Kohnken 1989). Unfortunately, strong ecological validity has often been lacking
in CBCA laboratory scenarios.
Steller, Wellerhaus, and Wolf (cited in Raskin & Esplin, 1992a) designed a
story telling competition with 98 schoolchildren from first through fourth grade.
Children were asked to tell two stories: one about an event that had happened to
them, and one that they invented. They were limited to topics that had direct
involvement, loss of control, and negative emotional tone (such as giving a blood
sample, or being attacked by a dog). Children had one week to make up their
stories, and were allowed to choose the categories themselves. Prizes were
offered to motivate children to tell convincing made-up stories, and parents
confirmed which stories were true, and which were false. CBCA was performed
on statements gathered in blind interviews. Only the medical-category showed
significant differences in CBCA ratings between the true and false stories.
Children picked this category the most, and Raskin and Esplin suggest that
children making up stories about the other categories (such as being chased by a
dog, or getting beaten up by another child) may have seen such events happen to
their friends, and so it was little different than if they had actually experienced
the event. Also, as Wells and Loftus (1992) noted, the external validity criteria
were not really met by Steller et. aPs study.
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Tye (1994) directly compared the performance of CBCA with that of
untrained lay evaluators with a set of 28 statements of known truthfulness from a
study by Devitt et al. (1994) on children's willingness to lie. Devitt et al. found
that approximately half of children would falsely accuse a researcher of having
stolen a book when asked to do so by a parental figure. The statements were
about a mock-crime the children had witnessed. Children were asked either by a
research assistant or a parent to lie about the theft of a book. In two conditions,
children saw the book being taken by the researcher or saw it being taken by
their parent. In the latter case, the parents asked the children to falsely accuse the
researcher after they came under suspicion. In a final condition, a book
mysteriously disappeared without the child noticing and the parent was later
accused of theft. The parent then asked the child to make up a story about the
researcher taking the book. All three of the Steller/Raskin and Esplin validity
demands were met: personal emotional and behavioral involvement, loss of
control, and negative emotional tone. The fourth standard, the involvement of a
person close to the child, was also met in this scenario. These materials are
described in detail in the next chapter.
Tye found that a discriminant analysis on CBCA scores correctly classified
89% of the statements (100% of the false statements, and 75% of the true
statements), compared with a near-chance performance of only 56% for lay
subjects (49% correct for false statements, and 65% correct for true statements).
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The medium of the testimony (videotape of an SVA-style interview or transcript)
did not affect subject performance. In this study, lay evaluators were only briefly
informed about the experimental scenario which generated the children's
statements. Raskin and Esplin (1992b) observed that CBCA is most susceptible to
being mistaken when everything a child describes is true, except for the identity
of the accused. However, in the study described by Tye, CBCA correctly
classified statements as false whether the statement was a pure fabrication about
an event the child had not seen, or whether the child was simply substituting the
name of a perpetrator. (A reanalysis of the classification was performed for the
present research, and is reported on in the Results chapter.)
A follow-up study (Tye, Honts, & Amato-Henderson, 1994) exposed the
evaluators to an experimental scenario in detail so that they might have the same
special information about the lab scenario script that the CBCA evaluators had
(thus controlling for a possible confound). Subjects were exposed to the scenario
complete script by viewing a trial run of the researcher taking the book. They
were verbally fully informed about the other two conditions. By being maximally
informed about the laboratory scenario generating the statements, lay evaluators
were given a "best shot" at maximizing performance. Although overall accuracy
went up significantly to 65% correct (62% correct for false statements, and 70%
correct for true statements), this was still significantly worse than CBCA. In this
follow-up, subjects were significantly more accurate with transcripts than with
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videotapes, suggesting that their ability to use the additional information was
interfered with when evaluating a videotape. An especially interesting finding
from both of these studies was that subject confidence in evaluations was not
related to accuracy of evaluations. In fact, not only was the correlation between
the two non-significant, it was near-zero!
Despite these mostly promising results, the relative importance of the
various criteria has not been agreed upon, nor has a consistent scoring system
been adopted. For example, in unpublished research, supplementation was only
observed by Littmann and Szewczyk in 8.7% of cases, spontaneous corrections in
20.7% of statements, and the quantity of details was relevant in only 35.8% of the
cases they looked at (cited in Steller & Kohnken, 1989). While some criteria
appear to be highly frequent and others to be relatively rare, recent research has
used relatively small sample sizes. Caution is thus indicated in discarding any
criteria. Additionally, no clear definition exists of what constitutes a truthful
score, nor how scores should be scaled to account for differences in the quantity
of testimony available. Yuille (cited in Joffe, 1992/1994) regarded the first group
as necessary but not sufficient. As noted before, exceptionally short testimonies
(e.g., from very nonverbal children) logically do not present the opportunity for
many criteria to be met, regardless of the truth of the testimony. While CBCA
attempts to be objective, whether a statement meets a given criteria or not is
partially a subjective judgment of the evaluator. For example, the presence of

47
inconsistencies might reveal an untruthful statement, or, on the other hand,
might be due to poor cognitive abilities or emotional trauma in the child. SVA
currently allows only for subjective assessments of the child's verbal and
intellectual functioning. The degree to which CBCA can be "fooled" by coached
children (or by memories changed by previous suggestive interviews) is also an
important issue.
Joffe (1992/1994) conducted an experiment in which lay evaluators were
extensively trained in CBCA and before making assessments of children's
statements. The goal of the study was to see experimentally test the Undeutsch
Hypothesis. Two groups of children (eight year olds and ten year olds) were in
one of three conditions. The first was a Live Event (LE), in which children were
actively involved in a staged event. The second was Heavily Coached (HE), in
which children did not experience the event but were told in detail about, and
were specifically told details that would constitute CBCA criteria. The third
condition was Lightly Coached, in which children were provided a brief account
of the event but had to supply their own details. They were then asked to recall
the event in individual interviews, and transcripts of these were analyzed by ten
undergraduate evaluators who had received extensive training in CBCA. The
scenario involved a child participating in an experiment during which a lamp
broke. The experimenter left the room to get a maintenance person, who then
came in and fixed the lamp. Next he noticed that a tape recorder was broken, and

48
he made a point of telling the child that he would take it to be fixed. He had the
child help him put the tape recorder into a backpack. Later the experimenter
returned arid said that the tape recorder contained an important tape, and she
needed some help to figure out what which maintenance person had been in the
room— this was the pretext for interviewing the child.
Joffe attended to the rigor of the training, noting commentary by Yuille
and Undeutsch about the importance of extensive training for adequate use of
the technique. Initially evaluators received four two-hour sessions personally
conducted by CBCA-expert Yuille. After tests showed that subjects could not
reliably identify criteria the four with the highest scores on homework CBCA
coding were selected for additional training, and the others were assigned to a
minimally-trained control. The highly-trained subjects then received three
additional four-hour meetings, with homework, and a training manual until
subjects were performing at a high level of accuracy (as evaluated by Yuille by
Joffe).
Both highly and weakly trained evaluators had a classification
performance of 50% (at chance). The individual criteria ratings of trained
evaluators were also analyzed, and as was predicted there were significantly
more criteria in the LE than the LC conditions, and no difference between LE and
HE. Interestingly, this means that the highly trained evaluators were at least
partially effective at identifying the presence of criteria but still did not use this
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in their final decisions. For the younger children, there were no differences in
criteria across conditions. Perhaps the considerable difference between Joffe and
Tye's findings are due to the far greater emotional involvement in the mock
crime scenario than in the broken tape recorder scenario. This would suggest that
Undeutsch's concerns about the irrelevance of (most) laboratory research are
fully justified!
Memon, Cronin, Eaves, and Bull (1993) examined the amount of
information obtained from children in a cognitive interview compared with a
traditional (structured) interview. The cognitive interview is a technique involves
the mental recreation of the original context of an event, the instruction to report
everything, recall in a variety of orders, and the description of an event from
different perspectives. It also directs the interviewer to begin with rapport
building, to be sensitive to the structure of the interview (moving from openended to closed questions), and to pay attention to non-verbal responses. It
therefore has some similarity to an SVA interview. They found little
improvement in information content with the cognitive interview. It should be
noted that their event— a vision test in school— failed to meet the Steller/Raskin
and Esplin standards of generalizability mentioned above.
A study by Vondergeest (1992) found that expert testimony on SVA did
not greatly influence evaluations of the guilt of an accused person in a mock trial
video tape created by Margaret Bull-Kovera and Eugene Borgida. This trial was
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fabricated and the child's statement was scripted to ambiguous and performed
by an actor, which limits the generalizability of Vondergeest's findings.
Evaluation of Adult Statements
Several researchers have looked at the effects of training lay individuals in
CBCA. Most of these have had the evaluators examine adult statements. It
should be emphasized that the application of CBCA to adult statements is a
marked departure from the German use of CBCA. These studies may add insight
into CBCA, but any generalization to child statement assessment should be done
with extreme caution.
A study by Landry and Brigham (1992) looked at CBCA training in naive
subjects and their ability to evaluate statements made by adults. In a 2x2 design,
half of the 114 subjects received brief forty-five minute training in CBCA and half
did not. Training was conducted in a single session with a group leader
discussing each of the criteria, and then illustrating their application to a sample
statement. Subjects then evaluated the truthfulness of twelve videotaped
statements about a traumatic experience made by adults (half of which were
true, and half of which were false). Subjects trained in CBCA performed
significantly better than chance and significantly more accurately than those who
were not trained in CBCA. Ten of 14 criteria were significant discriminators (as
scored by the recently trained undergraduates). Despite these promising results,
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they are of uncertain generalizability as subjects were evaluating adult
statements.
Ruby (1995) examined racial differences in the presence of criteria in
statements. He argued that CBCA was developed on white Europeans and that it
might not apply to statements from African Americans. His hypothesis was
based cn the observation that verbal behavior is learned, and that learned
traditions vary across cultures. He found small differences in the overall
presence of criteria by race of speaker, and no differences in the overall presence
of criteria by the truthfulness of the statement. However, he found that a
discriminant analysis of the criteria was able to differentiate true and false
statements. He also found that the optimal function depended on the race of the
speaker. However, Ruby's technique had several flaws that greatly limits the
utility of his findings. Most importantly, he used adult speakers. Secondly, the
true and false statements were of greatly varying content as African American
subjects were allowed to generate any true or false statement. Statements from
adult whites were drawn from a larger archival set to approximate the content of
the statements from six African American subjects. Statements varied
considerably in emotional intensity (for example, a description of a parent dying
of aids, a description of breaking up with a girlfriend). Third, only brief training
was provided to the evaluators. Raters were trained for forty-five minutes by an
undergraduate research assistant explaining the basis of the technique as they
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followed along a written outline. Fourth, the racial difference may have been an
artifact of the statements as race was not randomly assigned to statement. In his
discussion, Ruby first suggests that his use of transcripts of statements meant
that raters could not utilize nonverbal information, and only later points out his
nonstandard application of CBCA.
Kohnken, Thurer, and Zoberbier (1994) have examined the use of the
cognitive interview with adult subjects. They found that the use of the cognitive
interview with adults significantly increased the recall of correct information
about a film about blood donation, without increasing the recall of erroneous
information. A more conventional structured interview generated less correct
recall. However, Kohnken, Schimossek, Aschermann, and Hofer (1995) found
that a cognitive interview increased both accurate recall as well as confabulation.
In this study they applied CBCA to a set of statements about witnessing a film of
a blood donation episode and found that a discriminant analysis correctly
classified 85% of the statements (adult subjects had either seen a film about blood
donation, or pretended they saw a film about blood donation). A conservative
jackknife resulted in an overall classification accuracy of 73% for CBCA, a rate
which is high considering the use of adults, the relatively innocuous subject
matter, and the ease with adults in the fabrication condition might have been
able to incorporate information from past medical experiences. When including
their six additional criteria, discriminant classification improved to 93% (with a
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jackknife accuracy of 75%). The following section presents research on the
performance of lay adults making evaluations of children's statements.
The Abilities of Untrained Evaluators
Jurors have a propensity to believe that mental health professionals can
tell whether a child has been sexually abused or not. In one study, 98% of jurors
surveyed thought this was the case, and 82% thought professionals could make
this judgment even in the absence of corroborating evidence (Corder &
Whiteside, 1988). Brodie (1993) has shown that in fact professionals perform near
chance, and fail to utilize CBC A training. However, what of the natural abilities
of lay evaluators?
Some of these studies described above contained controls who received no
special education, however many of these evaluations were made about adult
statements. There are a few relevant studies which consider the abilities of lay
evaluators to tell whether children are telling the truth or not (these did not even
examine the question of training, and simply looked at "natural" lay evaluation
performance).
As noted above, Tye (1994) found lay subjects to be 56% correct in
determining whether or not children were telling the truth about a crime they
witnessed and were asked by the thief to lie about (the thief was either a stranger
or a parent/guardian, this experiment is described in more detail below as the
statements obtained from it were used in the present research). Medium (written
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or video) did not affect overall subject performance. There were no differences
according to the age of the child, although subjects were more likely to rate boys
as being truthful (which may have been an artifact of the statements, although
the presence CBCA was unaffected by child sex).
In somewhat less emotionally involving scenarios, Vrij and van
Wijngaarden (1994) found accuracy rates of approximately 57%, using video
clips of children who were asked to convince an interviewer that a drink tasted
good even if it did not (two drinks, a pleasant and an unpleasant one, were used;
later, the children's actual evaluations of the drinks were recorded to verify the
experimental manipulation). Vrij and van Wijngaarden also found similar results
in follow-up experiment which had lay evaluators assess video clips of children
who were responding to suggestion, or responding free of suggestion, in
describing a film they had seen showing a man being angry to a child.
Westcott, Davies, and Clifford (1991) had lay subjects evaluate videotapes of
children being interviewed about a field trip (some children had taken a field trip
to a museum, some had not and were asked to pretend that they had visited a
museum). Overall accuracy rates of 59% were found.
All of these studies found that a subject's confidence in an evaluation is
unrelated to the subject's accuracy. Across widely different stimulus materials
evaluated on two continents, Tye (1994), Vrij and van Wijngaarden (1994), and
Westcott, Davies, and Clifford (1991) for the most part found non-significant
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correlations between accuracy and confidence. In the few cases in which there
was a significant correlation, it was always less than .1, suggesting that lay
evaluators are rather poor judges of the truthfulness of children's statements.

Objectives of the Present Research
Joffe (1.992/1994) noted that the technique requires extensive training to
use well, and both Undeutsch and Yuille have found that evaluators who have
had only a few days' of exposure to the technique do not apply it well (cited in
Joffe, 1992/1994). As described above, Brodie (1993) also found low utilization of
CBCA among U.S. social workers exposed to the technique. Although statement
analysis is a psychological specialization in Germany (Wegener, 1989), U.S.
courts are reluctant to have an expert testify as to the credibility of a witness or a
statement (Ruby, 1995). However, the standard federal rules of evidence will
allow expert testimony if it is relevant and deemed by the trial judge to be
helpful to a lay jury member (Honts & Perry, 1992). These rules would allow an
expert witness to educate a jury of lay persons about the criteria that are thought
to generally characterize a true statement, and CBCA may most readily be
introduced into the U.S. legal system in the form of expert testimony (Honts,
1994). No previous research has looked at the effects of exposure to such expert
testimony in CBCA on lay evaluation of children's statements. If such
abbreviated exposure to SVA helps lay evaluators, it should be adopted quickly,
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given the apparently poor assessment abilities of naive lay evaluators (and the
absence of any other assessment techniques).
The present study thus seeks to extend earlier work by Tye (1994) and
answer the question of whether exposure to CBCA expert testimony can enhance
the ability of lay evaluators to make assessments of children's statements. Other
studies have looked at the effects of brief didactic training in CBCA on lay
evaluators' performance, but none have looked at the effect on evaluation
performance of exposure to the testimony of an expert witness in a form similar
to that actually given in court. Further, previous studies have asked subjects to
evaluate children's statements of very low emotional saliency, or to evaluate
adult statements, or to evaluate an acted statement. The present research is
significant in asking lay evaluators to make assessments of actual children's
statements about an emotionally involving event.
It might be noted that short-term, passive exposure to CBCA seems to be
only minimally effective even for professionals. Yuille and Joffe (cited in Joffe,
1992/1994) have shown that even extensive training in CBCA is insufficient to
match the skills of Germany psychologists who study SVA for years before
becoming court-appointed experts. However, Landry and Brigham (1992) have
shown that relatively brief exposure to the technique can be quite effective.
Additionally, passive educational testimony about CBCA has already been
introduced into evidence in U.S. sexual abuse trials. This, coupled with the
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difficulty of implementing a German-style use of CBCA in U.S. courts, speaks to
the pressing importance of the present research which examines the specific
effects of exposure to expert testimony (Honts, 1994).
Four hypotheses were formulated for the present study. It was
hypothesized that the performance of naive evaluators would be similar to
previous findings, and would be found be slightly better than chance. Secondly,
it was hypothesized that exposure to expert-witness testimony on CBCA would
improve the performance of lay evaluators, and that this would be proportional
to how well subjects attended to the testimony. Third, it was hypothesized that
expert testimony per se would not improve performance— specifically that
exposure to a misleading testimony that parallels the factual testimony would
lower lay subject performance. Fourth, the classification performance of expert
application of CBCA was expected to be superior to the performance of both
naive lay evaluators and those who had been exposed to testimony.

CHAPTER III
STATEMENT MATERIALS

The child and expert statement materials that were used in the present
research are of particularly high ecological validity. Undeutsch's suspicion of
laboratory research on credibility assessment has been supported by studies
which weakly operationalize the experimental variables. The statements used in
this research are described in detail below.
Children's Statements
This experiment used videotaped children's statements that came from a
previous study completed at the University of North Dakota by Devitt et al.
(1994). This study involved children in a situation in which they had an incentive
to make false allegations. Although the children were r.ot themselves directly
victims of unpleasant actions, the situation was emotionally charged and highly
involving for the child. Two conditions involved making false allegations to
protect parent /guardians, in all conditions the child was an active participant in
a negative event. Upon debriefing, all children believed that a crime had taken
place. Therefore, the ecological validity and applicability to real sexual abuse
victim testimony may be as high as it is ethically possible to obtain in the
laboratory. Subjects were between the ages of 6 and 10.
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The study was explained to parents in full, and their cooperation enlisted
in instructing their children that they (the children) were going to take part in
some testing of their abilities at the university. After arriving at the psychology
building, the child subject and parental figure were escorted into an
experimental room by two research assistants (Researcher 1 and Researcher 2). In
that room, a student-confederate was "studying for a test." One of the two
researchers asked the "student" to leave, letting him or her know that he or she
could leave his or her study materials behind, including a textbook needed for
the student-confederate's next-day exam. (This was spoken about in front of the
child-subject.) Then, Researcher 2 had the child complete a number of tasks— a
card sort, drawing a picture, being weighed and measured. During this time,
Researcher 1 took the parent aside. While Researcher 1 and the parent were out
of the room, one of three situations occurred. Parents knew about the three
conditions beforehand, and had agreed to be randomly assigned to any of them.
Situation 1: True Accusation. In this condition, Researcher 2 observed the
student-confederate's textbook that had been left on the table, and remarked to
the child how nice the book was. Researcher 2 picked up the book, admired it,
and then told the child that he or she was going to take the book. Researcher 2
told the child that the theft was to be their secret and that the child should not
tell anyone that the book had been taken. Situation 2: Fantasy Accusation. In this
condition, the book was removed while the child was not looking. The child and
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parental figure were left alone in the room for a few moments. Later, the book
was "discovered" to be missing by the returning student-confederate, and a
scene occurred in which the student became very agitated and accused the
parent of taking the book. The child and parent were again left alone, and this
time the parent asked the child to protect him or her by falsely accusing
Researcher 2 of stealing the book. Situation 3: Perpetrator Substitution. As in
Situation 1, the child actually saw the book being taken, but this time, the parent
stole the book during a time when he or she was left alone with the child. The
guardian instructed the child that it was "to be their secret," and that the parent
would "get in trouble" if the child disclosed what really happened. Then the
parent asked the child to falsely accuse Researcher 2.
Later, the child was taken to a "campus police officer" who "had been
called" in an adjacent room and interviewed using the SVA technique. These
interviews were videotaped. To sum up, in Situation 1, True Accusation, the
child was asked to remain silent about a theft. Most children (appx. 85%) in this
condition failed to lie on behalf of the research assistant, and made a true
accusation. In Situation 2, Fantasy Accusation, the child was asked to make a
false accusation to protect the parent (some children may have believed the
researcher took the book since a book did disappear, some may not have
believed this to be true; in either case the children did not see anyone commit a
theft). Approximately two-thirds of the children in this situation did make a false
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statement (falsely accusing the research assistant of stealing the book to protect
the parent, the others were honest and said they did not know what happened to
the book). In Situation 3, Perpetrator Substitution, the child was asked by the
parent to falsely accuse the researcher as having taken the book in order to
protect the parent, even though the child had seen the parent take the book.
About half of the children in this condition falsely accused the research assistant
(the others either revealed the truth, that their parent stole the book, or failed to
make any accusation). At the end of the study, children were debriefed in full.
(They were praised if they told the truth and if they made a false accusation, they
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were told that it is often difficult to tell the truth, that many children also didn't
in the experiment, but that it is best to tell the truth.)
Across all three conditions, this previous study yielded twenty-eight
videotaped statements which contained at some point an allegation against the
research assistant. Those allegations were either true or false, and thus were
usable as source materials for the present study (see Table 6).
For the present study, the source materials consisted of the videotaped
interviews of those children's statements in which allegations were made, and
printed transcripts made from them. Appendix A contains a sample testimony
transcript (the reader is invited to try to determine which condition it came
from). Each videotaped interview lasted for approximately 10-12 minutes.
Subject names were deleted from the transcripts but left in the videotapes.
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Table 6: Breakdown of Useable Statem ents by Research Condition

TESTIMONY CONDITION

BOYS

GIRLS

TOTAL

True Accusation

4

8

12

Fantasy Accusation (false statement)

4

5

9

Perpetrator Substitution (false statement)

4

3

7

12

16

28

TOTAL

Expert Testimony
The CBCA training took the form of an expert testimony delivered by
Charles R. Honts, Ph.D,, an experimental psychologist who has studied SVA and
CBCA with Undeutsch and Raskin as well as co-authoring several studies on the
subject. The videotape lasted for approximately fifty minutes and was modeled
after actual testimony he has given in trials. The tape was made in a Virginia
courtroom with Dr. Honts on the witness stand, and off-camera an attorney
asked questions.
The testimony was in three sections. In the first section, Dr. Honts spoke
of the general nature of SVA. In the second section, he addressed each of the
criteria and provided examples of them. In the third section, he spoke of research
support for CBCA and SVA and the nature of scientific evidence. Dr. Honts'
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testimony was prepared in advance and was delivered without the use of a text.
A transcript of this preparatory text is to be found in Appendix B (this transcript
is therefore not a verbatim copy of the actual testimony).
A counter-training condition was prepared to mislead subjects. The
purpose of this was to see if training per se caused subjects to pay more
attention, and also to verify any effects of the CBCA training. The counter
training lasted for approximately forty-five minutes and consisted of the same
first and third sections. In the second section of the tape Dr. Honts testified that
the presence of the criteria signified a statement is false. The criteria were
presented in order, as with the true training tape, and changes were only made
to the text where necessary for the statement to appear reasonable. (For example,
in the misleading tape it was explained that children who suffer abuse are so
traumatized by the event that they are unable to recall a great quantity of detail,
therefore detail signify a false statement.)

CHAPTER IV
METHOD
Subjects
Undergraduate adults attending beginning and intermediate psychology
classes at the University of North Dakota were recruited for participation in a
study involving assessing the truthfulness of children's testimonies (N - 333,
mean age 22 years, 63% female). Subjects received extra credit points in
proportion to the length of the research condition they participated in. Subjects
were informed that they were eligible to compete for a $50 prize based on the
accuracy of their evaluations. In addition, subjects in the testimony conditions
were informed that they were eligible to compete for a second $50 prize based on
how well they remembered the testimony. Prizes were offered both as an
incentive for subjects to participate, and to increase attention and motivate
subjects to value the experiment as personally relevant.
Procedure
Subjects were recruited to participate in an experiment on assessing the
truthfulness of children's statements. They were informed in advance that they
would be evaluating videotaped and written statements, and that some subjects
might first receive exposure to information that might be helpful in making their
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evaluations. Subjects were run in groups according to a randomized mix of
testimony conditions and testimonies. At the start of the experiment subjects
were informed that they would be evaluating statements about an experiment in
which a child witnessed a book being taken. Subjects were told that at some
point during a subsequent interview a child would accuse a researcher of taking
a book. Subjects were also informed in both verba! and written directions that
each child's accusation was either true, and the children had seen the book stolen
by the researcher, or it was false. Appendix C contains the consent form,
testimony hand outs, and questionnaires.
Subjects in the testimony conditions viewed either the CBCA or the
counter-CBCA testimony. After a five minute break they then evaluated four
written child statements, followed by four videotaped child statements (each
subject thus evaluated a total of eight different statements; randomly,
approximately half of subjects evaluated the videotaped statements first). The
design was therefore 2x3: statement medium (written or video), by testimony
condition (none, CBCA, or counter-CBCA). Pilot runs determined that a total of
eight evaluations were possible within a ninety minute period. Accordingly the
twenty-eight statements were randomly assigned to seven groups, thus allowing
for eight different statements to be evaluated in a given experimental run (four
video and four different written). Each of the seven runs were repeated three
times (once under each testimony condition).

66
A resampling power analysis revealed that having each statement
(appearing uniquely once in each of the six cells) evaluated by fifteen different
people would yield a 91% probability of finding a main effect for testimony
condition, a 98% probability for finding a main effect for medium, and a 68%
probability of finding an interaction effect, under the assumption that a
difference from chance in evaluation accuracy actually existed and was large
enough to account for 1% of the variance in performance. An effect of this
magnitude would give a correlation of .1 between evaluation decision and
reality, and would correspond to an experimental population performance of
55% correct (the null hypothesis population would perform at chance, 50%
correct). This was determined to be sufficient power, and accordingly each
experimental run was repeated until at least fifteen subjects had participated.
Biographical information was collected from subjects at the beginning of
the experiment, and after each statement subjects were asked to make a threedecision forced-choice, selecting from the following: the child was telling the
truth about who stole the book, the child was willfully lying, or the child
believed what they were saying but the accusation was false. This made it
possible in data analysis to examine give evaluators the possibility of identifying
fantasy accusations, and yet at the same to allow for collapsing across the last
two responses to make a post-hoc true/false dichotomy. The true/false
evaluation permitted comparison of lay subject evaluation with the performance
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of CBCA. Subjects were also asked to rate their confidence in each decision on a
seven-point scale.
Biographical information included whether or not a subject had served on
a jury, whether the subject had children, the estimated number of hours of
contact with children between the ages of two and twelve (while the subject was
at least fourteen years old), and the subject's opinion about whether or not a
child would lie about a crime to a police officer (on a scale varying from children
always tell the truth to children cannot be trusted, plus a choice for "it depends
on the situation" and one for "it depends on the child").
Subjects in testimony conditions also received a handout listing the CBCA
criteria. In order to test for the impact of the availability of additional
information on recall, approximately one-third of subjects in testimony
conditions (randomly selected) received the handout after the testimony
videotape ended, the others received the handout before the testimony started
and were encouraged to make notes on it during the testimony. All subjects had
the handout available to them throughout the statement evaluation period, and it
was then collected before a final questionnaire was distributed.
The final questionnaire tested subjects' basic understanding of the testimony
material and their evaluation of Dr. Honts' testimony. A free-recall section was
provided to see the number of criteria that could be remembered. Subjects in the
no testimony condition received an abbreviated final questionnaire. All subjects
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were invited to comment on any other strategies they used to evaluate the
statements.
All subjects were debriefed by asking them not to discuss the experiment
for the remainder of the semester. (The final questionnaire also asked if they had
been previously exposed to the research.) Subjects in the counter-CBCA
condition were debriefed by being informed that the criteria are actually believed
to be present in true statements, and the reason for the deception was explained
to them. The testimony conditions ran for between two and half and three hours.
The no testimony condition took between one and a half and two hours.

CHAPTER V
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
A preliminary sorting of the data was done to eliminate any subjects who
had participated more than once, resulting in a discarding of approximately 10
records. This left 333 valid subjects for subsequent analysis, ranging in age from
19 to 60 (M=22 years). Of these, 63% identified themselves as female, and 35%
identified themselves as male (the remainder failed to provide a response). This
represents an average of 15.9 evaluations for each testimony in each of the six
cells (three testimony conditions by two statement medium conditions), in
accordance with the power analysis presented in the Methods chapter.
The primary response from subjects that forms the focus of the analyses
presented below was the forced-choice decision about the essential truthfulness
of each child's accusation. These materials are described in detail in the Materials
chapter. Briefly, at some point in each statement, the children accused a research
assistant of stealing a book. In the True Accusation condition, a researcher had
taken a book in front of the child, and had asked the child to keep it a secret. In
the Fantasy Accusation condition, a book had vanished, and later the child's
parent (or guardian) was accused of the theft. The parent had then asked the
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child to say that the researcher had taken the book. In the Perpetrator
Substitution condition, the parent had taken the book in front of the child, and
then was accused of stealing it. The parent then asked the child to accuse the
researcher to protect the parent. In both Perpetrator Substitution and False
conditions, the child's accusation about who took the book was false.
Lay evaluators were given three evaluation choices for each statement, as
follows: the accusation was true (and the researcher stole the book), the
accusation was a lie (and the researcher did not take the book), or the accusation
was a fantasy in which the child believed (but still, the researcher did not take
the book).
Therefore, each statement has three real possible values (True Accusation,
Fantasy Accusation, Perpetrator Substitution) and each lay evaluation has three
analogous values. In order to clarify the analysis, where appropriate, the two
false possibilities have been collapsed into a single category of "false" (for both
statement reality and evaluation choice).
Seven subjects indicated that they had prior experience in assessing the
credibility of children, and sixteen had previously served on a jury. Subjects
reporting prior experience in credibility assessment had an overall average of 4.6
correct evaluations, compared to 5.0 correct evaluations for the 327 subjects with
no prior training. An independent sample f-test on prior experience determined
this difference to be non-significant, K331) = 0.76, p - .45, two-tailed. Sixteen
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subjects reported prior jury duty, with these having an overall average of 4.6
correct evaluations, compared to 5.0 correct evaluations for the 317 subjects
reporting no jury duty. Again, an independent sample f-test on jury duty
indicated that this was a non-significant difference, f(331) = 0.84, p = .40. Given
the small number of cases involved and the fact that these variables did not have
a significant independent effect on performance, it was decided to leave these
subjects in subsequent analyses on the basis that their presence makes the
experimental sample more accurately reflect the experiences of the general
population of lay evaluators.
Lay evaluators were asked to indicate whether they thought a child would
lie about a crime to a police officer. They were also asked to estimate their total
care-giving contact with young children (defined as contact with children ages 2
to 12, after the individual was 14 or older). The responses to these questions are
presented in Figure 1. The extent to which these variables predict subject
performance is examined below in a multiple regression. There was a near-zero,
non-significant correlation between reported hours of child contact and response
to children's willingness to lie about a serious matter. Most subjects (91%)
reported having no children, the remainder had between one and four children.
The lay evaluator data was coded into two distinct sets. One data set
preserved each subject's evaluations (of a subset of the 28 statements) for a
logistic regression analysis of factors predicting lay performance. This set is
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Figure 1: Beliefs about Children's W illingness to Lie, Hours of Child Contact
"A child m akes an accusation about a crim e to a police officer."
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referred to as the subject-wise data set. The second data set treated each
evaluation as an independent observation, making it possible to perform
analyses on the entire set of statements. This second data set therefore contained
2,664 observation/evaluations, and is referred to as the evaluation-wise data set.
Matching original subject demographic information and appropriate statement
information were coded for each observation to permit more detailed analysis of
interaction effects. Table 7 describes the variables that were examined in the
following analyses. Some variables appear in either column depending on the
analysis, and represent dependent measures that were used post-hoc as grouping
factors.
For testimony conditions, two raters examined the free-recall memory
questionnaire administered at the end of the experiment. Three variables were
coded (the first two were not applicable for the no-testimony condition). The first
variable scored was the number of unique responses corresponding
approximately to correctly recalled criteria (criteria were the same for both the
CBCA and counter-CBCA conditions). The second variable scored was the
number of unique responses listed as criteria that met the following two
conditions: they were not mentioned in the testimony videotape, and they were
clearly counter to the material mentioned in the testimony videotape (commonly
occurring examples included "fidgeting" and "shifty eyes"). Responses that were
neither clearly criteria nor counter to the testimony were ignored (for example,
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Table 7: Variables Examined in Each Group of Analyses Conducted

INDEPENDENT

DEPENDENT

Analyses of Experimental Hypotheses

Analyses of Experimental Hypotheses

Testimony condition
Medium of statement

Evaluation (correct/incorrect)
Criteria correctly recalled
Whether subjects understood basic premise of
testimony

Post-Hoc Analyses
Testimony condition
Medium of statement
Actual truth of a statement
Subject sex

Post-Hoc Analyses
Evaluation (correct/incorrect)
Confidence in Evaluation
Which medium subjects felt was easier to evaluate
Whether subjects thought testimony helped*
Subject evaluations of expert's competency’
Opinion about how convincing expert was*
*

no-testimony cases excluded

Regression Analysis

Regression Analysis

Subject grade
Subject age
Subject sex
Jury duty experience
Number of children subject has
Hours of child contact subject has
Prior training in assessing statements
Reported belief about whether a child would lie to a
police officer about a crime
Order of statements (videos preceding or following
transcripts)
When subject received testimony handout
Subject's mean confidence for all eight evaluations
Which medium subjects felt was easier to evaluate
Whether subjects thought testimony helped
Subject evaluations of expert's competency
Opinion about how convincing expert was
Whether subjects understood basic premise of
testimony
Number of criteria correctly recalled
Number of incorrect criteria offered during recall
Presence of incorrect criteria in open-ended
comments

Subject performance: recoded as a continuous
numerical variable with values of 0-1 (reflecting
the percent correct out of eight evaluations)
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ambiguous responses such as "repetition")- The third variable, scored for
subjects in all three conditions, examined subject responses to an open-ended
question soliciting any other strategies subjects may have used in determining
which statements were true. This was scored as present if subjects gave one or
more common-sense methods which, according to CBCA, are ineffective means
of assessing the reality of a statement (e.g., "fidgeting," "shifty eyes," "saying
'um ' often"). A subset of records (14%) was scored by both raters, which yielded
an inter-rater correlation of .98 for the number of criteria correctly recalled
during free-recall, .87 for the number of incorrect responses given as criteria
during free-recall, and .94 for the presence or absence of questionable commonsense methods in responses to the open-ended question (all three significant,
p < .05). This would suggest satisfactory inter-rater reliability, particularly for the
most important of the three measures, the total number of criteria accurately
recalled.
In order to further test the influence of testimony exposure, a randomly
selected subset of one-third of subjects in testimony conditions received the
CBCA handout after the videotaped testimony had finished. The other subjects
received the handout at the start of the testimony videotape and were
encouraged to take notes. All subjects had the handout throughout the statement
evaluation period. Subjects who received the handout at the start of the
testimony videotape had a mean total number of criteria accurately recalled of
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4.85, compared with 3.79 for subjects who received the handout later. This
difference approached but did not reach significance, f(206) = 1.91, p = .0: . This
would suggest that subjects were at least superficially attending to the testimony,
as the option of taking notes during the testimony increased subsequent recall of
criteria.
Analyses of Experimental Hypotheses
Figure 2 shows the main effects of Testimony and Medium on lay
evaluator performance, as well as the interaction between these two variables.
There was a significant main effect of testimony, F(2, 2658) = 3.27, p = .038.
Subjects with no testimony exposure had highest proportion of correct
evaluations (64.5%), followed by subjects who had b< n exposed to CBCA
testimony (63.4% correct), followed by subjects who had received the counterCBCA testimony (59.4% correct). The LSD test indicated that only the difference
between counter-CBCA and no testimony exposure was significant (p = .015).
The difference between CBCA and counter-CBCA testimony approached
significance (p - .066). There was a significant main effect of medium, H I,
2658) = 5.65, p - .018. Subjects performed significantly better with transcripts
than with videotapes, with 64.6% correct vs. 60.1% correct. There was no
significant interaction effect between statement medium and type of testimony.
Table 8 summarizes this ANOVA.
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Figure 2: Effects of Testimony and Medium on Performance
Plot c f Means (unweighted), TESTIMONY Main Effect
F(2,2658)=3.27; p<.0382

Plot of Means (unweighted), MEDIUM Main Effect

F(1,2658)=5.65; p<.0175

Plot of Means, 2-way interaction

CORRECT

F(2,2658)=.23; p<.7S35
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Table 8: Summary of Testimony x Medium ANOVA

Testimony
Medium
Testimony x
Medium

df
Effect

MS
Effect

df
Erroi

MS
Error

2
1
2

.765170
1.323979
.054157

2658
2658
2658

.234136
.234136
.234136

F

3.268059
5.654743
.231304

p-leve!

.038233
.017479
.793514

Homogeneity of variance was not problematic for the overall design, with
a non-significant Cochran's C = .17 (p = .867). The range of performance across all
testimony conditions was 59%-65% correct. Planned comparisons are now
presented which compare the effects of testimony exposure against chance
performance (50%).

Hypothesis 1: Performance of Naive Lay Evaluators
A resampling analysis was conducted (see Appendix D for a summary of
resampling including resampling programs) to directly compare the
performance of lay evaluators with no testimony exposure (64.5% correct)
against chance. As would be expected with such a large sample size, this reached
significance, bootstrap p < .001.
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Hypothesis 2: Effects of CBCA Testim ony on Lay Evaluators
For subjects exposed to CBCA testimony, 63.4% of evaluations were
correct, not significantly different from lay evaluators who had no testimony
exposure. This performance was also significantly better than chance
performance (50%), bootstrap p < .001. The correlation between the number of
criteria a subject recalled and whether or the subject's evaluation was correct was
non-significant and near-zero (r = -.06, performed on evaluations in CBCA
testimony only), suggesting that subjects who attended to the testimony better
did not perform any differently from subjects not attending to the testimony. (A
subject-wise analysis of number of criteria recalled and total evaluations correct
for CBCA testimony exposure also resulted in a near-zero, non-significant
correlation, r = -.16.) Subjects were asked to indicate whether the presence of
criteria suggests a statement is true or false, 98% of those responding to this
question correctly selected true. When subjects received the handout had no
effect on accuracy, although as noted above it did significantly effect the recall of
criteria. This suggests that subject difficulty in utilizing the testimony was not
necessarily a function of memory deficits.
Hypothesis 3: Effects of Misleading Testimony on Lay Evaluators
For subjects exposed to the counter-CBCA testimony, 59.4% of evaluations
were correct. This is significantly better than chance, bootstrap p < .001, and
significantly worse than no testimony (as reported above). This suggests that the
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counter-testimony was an effective manipulation that functioned as predicted.
Interestingly, the correlation between criteria recalled and performance was also
near-zero and non-significant (r = .02), suggesting that more close attending to
the materials did not increase the deleterious effect of misleading testimony. On
the contrary, the testimony apparently only confused subjects— suggested by the
fact that, in a final questionnaire, 35% of subjects in the counter-CBCA condition
indicated that the presence of criteria means a statement is true. The performance
of subjects exposed to counter-CBCA testimony was reanalyzed to compare the
performance of those who apparently misunderstood the testimony wi th those
who understood it (and were successfully misled). For those who reported that
the presence of criteria meant a statement was false (as the misleading testimony
indicated), 58.6% of evaluations were correct, compared with 60.2% of
evaluations being correct for subjects who reported that the criteria indicate a
statement is true. Nevertheless, post-hoc analyses presented below suggest that
the counter-CBCA testimony was partially successful in misleading subjects in
the expected direction. The difference between the performance of these two was
non-significant (bootstrap p = .662), and both were significantly better than
chance, bootstrap p < .001. The correlations between recall and performance were
non-significant for both subsets of counter-CBCA subjects.
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Post-Hoc Analyses of Lay Evaluator Performance
The children's statements used in the present research were real and not
contrived. Given the limited number of these statements and the scenario that
generated them, it was not possible to match child characteristics and statement
quality across true and false statements. For this reason, in order to be
conservative, the planned analyses presented above did not treat statement
reality as an independent variable. The post-hoc analyses presented below,
however, considers dichotomous statement reality (true/false) as a grouping
factor in order to better understand the nature of lay subject performance. In
addition, subject sex is also analyzed post-hoc as an independent variable.

Examination of Secondary Factors and Measures
A MANOVA was run with Testimony, Medium, Subject Sex and
Statement Reality (true or false) as independent factors. Dependent measures for
this analysis were evaluation (correct/incorrect), confidence in evaluation, and
which medium subjects indicated they found easiest to evaluate. This analysis
examined possible interactions between the most interesting post-hoc grouping
variables. Results are presented in Table 9. In addition to the main effects of
testimony on number correct discussed above, this revealed a significant
interaction effect between subject sex and testimony on subject evaluations of
which testimony medium was easier to evaluate. A Scheffe test revealed only one
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Table 9: Testimony x Medium x Subject Sex x Statement Reality MANOVA

DESIGN:
4 - w ay MANOVA, fixed effects
W HCHEASY EVALCNF CORRECT
DEPENDENT: 3 variables:
1SUBJSEX (2 ): male female
BETWEEN:
2TESTIMON( 3):none CBCA COUNTER
3MEDIUM (2): video transcript
4ACTUALTF( 2):true false
WITHIN:
none

Summary of all Effects; design:
1-SUBJSEX, 2-TESTIMON, 3-MEDIUM, 4-ACTUALTF

Effect

Wilks'
Lambda

Rao's R

df 1

1

.979504

17.00536

2

.984660

3

df 2

p-level

3

2438

.000000

6.30570

6

4876

.000001

.996326

2.99666

3

2438

.029621

4

.989612

8.53057

3

2438

.000012

12

.990242

3.99414

6

4876

.000541

13

.998746

1.02069

3

2438

.382350

23

.999913

.03555

6

4876

.999813

14

.999634

.29716

3

2438

.827475

24

.990594

3.84909

6

4876

.000780

34

.996894

2.53216

3

2438

.055384

123

.999556

.18035

6

4876

.982294

124

.997458

1.03467

6

4876

.400445

134

.998834

.94895

3

2438

.416020

234

.997519

1.00993

6

4876

.416689

1234

.997823

.88603

6

4876

.504038
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significant comparison, with more female subjects in the CBCA condition
indicating that transcripts were easiest to evaluate than female subjects in the
counter-CBCA condition (p = .035). This comparison is presented in Figure 3. As
can be seen, all subjects thought that videotapes were easier to evaluate than
transcripts, and (excepting the contrast already noted) there was a non
significant trend for females to indicate more often than males that videotapes
were easiest.
There was no relationship between confidence in evaluations and
accuracy of evaluations, with the non-significant correlation of r - -.03. Although
confidence in evaluations was not related to performance, the ratings of
confidence differed according to experimental manipulation. The MANOVA
indicated a significant interaction between testimony condition and subject sex
on evaluation confidence. As shown in Figure 4, females were slightly less
confident than males overall (Scheffe p < .001). Testimony tended to increase
evaluation confidence compared to no-testirnony for both males and females,
with the exception of counter-CBCA testimony, which reduced confidence
significantly for females but increased it for males (Scheffe p < .001). Evaluation
confidence was made on a discrete seven point scale (subjects chose one of the
following: completely confident, mostly confident, somewhat confident, fiftyfifty, somewhat uncertain, mostly uncertain, completely uncertain; this was then
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Figure 3: Testim ony and Sex on W hich Statem ent Medium Subjects Preferred
Which was easiest to evaluated?
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Figure 4: Effect of Testim ony and Subject Sex on Evaluation Confidence
Plot of Means (unweighted), 2-way interaction
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coded from 0-6 with higher numbers indicating increasing uncertainty). The
actual difference in confidence is small across all conditions, somewhere in
between the judgment "mostly confident" and "somewhat confident." There was
also a small relationship between correct recall of criteria and confidence,, with
subjects who recalled more criteria being slightly more confident (r = .12, p < .05
[adjusted to reflect reverse scoring of confidence]).
Follow-up Scheffe comparison tests revealed no significant differences in
evaluation accuracy for either subject sex or the subject sex by testimony
interaction. Overall subjects were slightly more confident in their evaluations of
videotaped statements than in their evaluations of transcripts (M = 1.46 vs.
M = 1.57, respectively, p = .02). Subjects were also slightly more confident with
their evaluations of true statements compared to false statements (M = 1.44 vs.
M = 1.58, p = .002). A number of cell means for evaluation confidence differed
significantly for the testimony condition by statement reality interaction. The
greatest difference was between subjects who received no testimony exposure
being least confident with false statements (M - 1.77) and subjects who received
counter-CBCA testimony exposure being most confident with true statements
(M = 1.37, p < .001). In absolute terms these confidence differences are trivial,
both rounding to somewhere in between "mostly confident" and "somewhat
confident" for decisions about both true and false statements in either transcript
or videotaped form under any testimony condition.
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The interaction between statement reality and testimony condition had a
significant effect on accuracy. Overall, subjects were correct much more often
with false statements (65.6%) than with true statements (57.7%), p < .001.
Furthermore, Scheffe comparison tests revealed that this difference was due
entirely to a single combination of testimony condition and statement reality:
subjects in the counter-CBCA testimony condition evaluating true statements
performed significantly worse (45.9% correct, p < .001) than subjects in the other
five cells, which were not significantly different from one another (and ranged
from 63% to 67% correct). A bootstrap analysis revealed subject performance
with true statements in the counter-CBCA condition to be significantly worse
than chance, p = .047. Figure 5 illustrates the effect of this interaction on
performance. This provides evidence that the counter-testimony was effective in
misleading subjects.
A second MANOVA was performed to look at the effects of testimony
condition and subject sex on subject-wise evaluations of whether or not
testimony was helpful, and how competent and convincing the expert was
deemed. No-testimony cases were eliminated for this analysis. All three
dependent measures were recorded on seven point scales (the full text of the
questions appears in Appendix C). The analysis was non-significant, indicating
no influences of subject sex or testimony condition on evaluations about the
helpfulness and competency of the expert (and also supporting the idea that the
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Figure 5: Effects of Testimony and Statement Reality on Performance
Plot of Means (unweighted), 2-way interaction
Rao R (6,4876)=3.85; p< 0008

-•a- ACTUALLY
false

- o - ACTUALLY
true

counter-CBCA testimony was as convincing as the CBCA testimony). Overall,
subjects who received testimony exposure viewed the expert as competent and
convincing, and reported that they felt it helped them "a little" in their
evaluations. A visual presentation of subject opinion about the expei t testimony
is presented in Figure 6. The correlation matrix for these three measures is
presented in Table 10.
O ther Predictors of Lay Evaluation Performance
There was a significant correlation between statement condition (threelevel) and lay subject evaluation (three corresponding alternatives), r = .25
(p < .001). A similar significant correlation (r = .24) was observed between
dichotomous statement reality (true/false) and the subject evaluation recoded to
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Figure 6: Subject Evaluations of Testim ony Helpfulness and Persuasiveness
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Table 10: Inter-Correlations of Subject Evaluation of Testimony

Marked correlations are significant at p < .05
N=201 (C.asewise deletion of missing data)
Testimony
Helpful

Expert
Competency

Expert
Convincing

Testimony Helpful

1.00

.27

.27

Expert Competency

.27

1.00

.45

Expert Convincing

.27

.45

1.00

group false statements together, indicating that the additional alternatives
provided no more information. Separate analyses revealed no other differences
between the twro false types of statement, or on the three-alternative subject
evaluation.
Child sex was examined in a 5-way ANOVA (testimony condition by
medium by statement reality by subject sex by child sex). This was not included
in the above analyses because child sex was not truly randomly assigned across
statements. There was a significant two-way interaction between medium and
child sex, F (1, 2554) = 4.87, p = .027. The follow-up Scheffe test revealed one
significant contrast, with 66.5% of subject evaluations of male children's
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videotape statements being correct, compared with 57.2% correct of subject
evaluations of male children's transcripts (p = .017).
A multiple regression analysis was performed (with each subject serving
as a case) in order to see if any subject characteristics would predict subject
performance. The total number correct (out of eight possible evaluations) was
recoded as a proportion to make a continuous variable to serve as the predictor
in the multiple regression. Predictor variables are listed above in Table 7
(confidence was averaged across evaluations to facilitate analysis). Because of the
large number of variables, mean substitution was used for missing data
(otherwise 47% of the cases would have been eliminated, even though each of
these cases had no more than a few missing items). The analysis was not
significant, Multiple R2 = .057, p = .53. This also supported that testimony
exposure did not significantly impact on performance, even considering the
effects of correct and incorrect responses during free-recall of criteria.

Perform ance of CBCA
Presence of Criteria
The panel of expert CBCA evaluators scored the children's transcripts to
consensus on a scale of 0 (absent), 1 (present), or 2 (strongly present). Table 11
shows the frequency of finding each criterion in true and false statements, as well
as the mean score found for each criterion. Criteria 11 (related external
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Table 11: Presence of Criteria in Child Statements by Condition

(0,1, or 2)

S co res for e a ch criterio n
P e rce n t o f s tatem en ts
w ith crite rio n p rese n t

(score of 1 or 2)

T ru e
C R IT E R IA

T ru e (N = 1 2 )

F alse (N = 1 6 )

(N = 1 2 )

F alse
(N = 1 6 )

M

SD

M

SD

63%

1 .5 0

0 .6 7

069

0 .6 0

G en eral C h a ra cte ristics
1

L og ical stru c tu re

92 %

2

U n s tru c tu re d p ro d u ctio n

92%

*

44%

1 .1 7

0 .5 8

0 .4 4

0.51

3

Q u a n tity o f d etails

83%

*

13%

1 .08

0 .6 7

0 .1 3

0 .3 4

*

6%

1.08

0 .7 9

0 .0 6

0 .2 5

13%

0 .5 0

0 .6 7

0 .1 3

0 .3 4

13%

0 .8 3

0 .7 2

0 .1 3

0 .34

Specific C o n te n ts
4

C o n te x tu a l e m b e d d in g

75%

5

In teractio n s

42%

6

R e p ro d u ctio n o f sp eech

67%

7

U n e x p e cte d co m p lica tio n s

0%

0%

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

8

U n u su a l d e ta ils

0%

0%

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

9

S u p e rflu o u s d etails

75%

31%

0 .7 5

0 .4 5

0.31

0 .4 8

12

S ubjective e x p e rie n ce

25%

13%

0 .2 5

0 .4 5

0 .1 3

0 .3 4

13

A ccu se d 's m en tal sta te

17%

6%

0.17

0 .3 9

0 .0 6

0 .2 5

14

S p o n ta n e o u s c o rre ctio n s

8%

6%

0 .0 8

0 .2 9

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

7 .4 2

3 .3 7

2 .0 6

1.57

*

**

M ean

percent p re s e n t (of 12):

48%

*

16%

M ean

number o f crite ria p re se n t:

5 .7 5

*

2 .0

M ean su m of in d iv id u al sco res:

N o te s:

* p < .01

** p < .0 2
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associations), 15 (admitting lack of memory), 16 (raising doubt's about one's own
testimony), 17 (self-deprecation), 18 (pardoning the accused), and 19 (details
char? cteristic of the offense) were not scored as the panel of evaluators
determined these to be particular to statements about sexual abuse, and not
salient for the crime scenario. A two-way ANOVA conducted on sum total
criteria correct with statement condition (trichotomous) and child sex as
independent variables revealed a significant main effect for statement condition,
F(2, 22) = 19.66, p < .001. Scheffe post-hoc comparisons revealed there to be no
significant difference in the presence of criteria in the two types of false
statement (for Perpetrator Substitution, M = 1.0, SD = 0.6, for Fantasy
Accusation, M = 2.9, SD = 1.6). True statements were significantly higher in
criteria than either type of false statement (p < .001, M = 7.4, SD = 3.4). True
statements had a median of 8 criteria present and ranged from 0 to 13. False
statements had a median of 2 criteria present and ranged from 0 to 6. Figure 7
shows the cumulative contributions of individual criterion scores by statement
condition. The main effect of child sex and its interaction with statement reality
were not significant.
Figure 8 shows the distribution of the average total score by statement
condition, and also presents this information fitted to a normal curve. As can be
seen, there is little overlap between the two distributions, with false statements
being narrowly distributed around a cumulative sum across criteria of 2, and
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Figure 7: Scores of Criteria by Statement Type: Cumulative Contributions
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c rite rio n s ig n ific a n tly
d iffe r e n t f o r tru e a n d fa ls e
s ta te m e n ts :

* p < .01
** p < .02

CRITERIA

true statements being somewhat more widely distributed around a cumulative
sum of 8. If comparing these sums with other research, note again that each
criterion could contribute 0, 1, or 2 points to the sum.
A final analysis considered the effects of length of statement and child age
on sum total criteria by examining the inter-correlation matrix for these three
variables. Length was measured as the word count for the child's utterances
during an interview (after deleting all interviewer questions). There were no
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Figure 8: D istributions of M ean Sum of Criteria Scores
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significant correlations (largest r = .23, smallest p > .25), demonstrating that
CBCA scoring was unaffected by either the child's age or verbosity. Furthermore,
an independent-measures t-test on true and false statements revealed no
significant differences in statement length between conditions (false statements
M = 458 words, SD = 225, true statements M = 471 words, SD = 122; range for all
statements was 191 to 843 words).
Classification Performance
A discriminant analysis was performed on the expert CBCA scoring. The
sum total of the criteria scores as well as the individual criterion scores were
entered into a discriminant analysis using the direct method of entering all
predictors at the same time. Criteria 7, 8, and 14 (unexpected complications,
unusual details, and spontaneous corrections) were necessarily excluded from
the analysis because were absent from all statements. The results of the
discriminant analysis are presented in Table 12. Of the 28 statements, 25 were
correctly classified (89% correct), with 100% of the 16 false statements being
correctly classified, and 75% of the 12 true statements being correctly classified.
A forward step-wise logistic regression was also conducted on the CBCA
scores. A logistic regression is indicated for a dichotomous dependent variable.
With the present data, the logistic regression however utilized only the total of
criteria and its classification performance was slightly worse than the
discriminant analysis (86% correct overall). Details are presented in Table 13.
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Table 12: Discrim inant An alysis on Expert CBCA Classification

F en

1*

P et of

Cum

E ig e n v a lu e

V a ria n ce

Pet

C an on ical
C o rr

1 .5 7 4 5

1 0 0 .0 0

1 0 0 .0 0

.7 8 2 0

A fter
Fen

Lam bda

W ilk s'
C h isq u are

DF

Sig

0

.3 8 8 4

1 9 .8 5 9

10

.0 3 0 6

:

’‘M a rk s th e 1 ca n o n ica l d iscrim in a n t fu n ction re m a in in g in the an aly sis.

CLASSIFICATION RESULTS:

False Testimonies

—

100% correct (16 of 16)

True Testimonies

—

75% correct

(9 of 12)

All Testim onies

—

89% correct

(25 of 28)

Standardized Canonical
Discriminant Function
Coefficients

Pooled within-groups
correlation between
discriminant vars. &
discriminant function

Logical structure

-.04414

.52484

2

Unstructured production

-.06155

.55183

3

Quantity of details

.38636

.77458

4

Contextual embedding

.50050

.76017

5

Descriptions of interactions

.25216

.30122

6

Reproduction of speech

.42517

.54280

9

Superfluous details

-.07797

.38284

-.10217

.13043

13 Accused's mental state

.20969

.13471

14 Spontaneous corrections

.47121

.18164

Criterion

1

12 Subjective experience
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Table 13: Logistic Regression on Expert CBCA Classification

Method: Forw ard Stepwise (COND)
Variable

B

CTOTAL

.7290

Constant

-3.4369

S.E.

Wald

df

.2457

8.8064

1

.0030

1.1807

8.4741

1

.0036

CLASSIFICATION RESULTS:

Sig

R

Exp(B)

.4219

2.0731

False Testimonies

—

88% correct

(14 of 16)

True Testimonies

—

83% correct

(10 of 12)

All Testim onies

—

86% correct

(24 of 28)

VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION
Block 0

Block 1 (after removing CTOTAL)
df

S co re

Sig

R

S co re

df

Sig

R

Cl

8 .4 7 0 2

1

.0 0 3 6

.4 1 1 3

.8 6 2 2

1

3531

.0 0 0 0

C2

9 .0 7 4 1

1

.0 0 2 6

.4301

.1 7 1 4

1

.6 7 8 9

.0000

C3

1 3 .6 0 1 5

1

.0 0 0 2

.5 5 0 8

.0 2 1 7

1

.8828

.0 0 0 0

C4

1 3 .3 3 8 9

1

.0 0 0 3

.5 4 4 5

.6481

1

.4 2 0 8

.0 0 0 0

C5

3 .5 0 0 0

1

.0 6 1 4

.1 9 8 0

.3 0 2 6

1

.5823

.0000

C6

8 .8 7 2 8

1

.0 0 2 9

.4 2 3 9

.7 7 3 0

1

.3793

.0000

C9

5 .2 5 0 0

1

.0 2 1 9

.2 9 1 5

.2 9 1 2

1

.5895

.0000

C 12

.7 3 0 4

1

.3 9 2 7

.0 0 0 0

.0 1 1 5

1

.9 1 4 7

.0000

C 13

.7 7 7 8

1

.3 7 7 8

.0 0 0 0

.1415

1

.7068

.0 0 0 0

C 14

1 .3 8 2 7

1

.2 3 9 6

.0 0 0 0

.1 0 0 7

1

.7509

.0 0 0 0

15.3 5 6 1

1

.0001

.5 9 1 0

V a r i a b le

CTOTAL
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Both a discriminant analysis and a logistic regression may be said to have
optimized their classification based on the observed data. A more conservative
test of the population performance of CBCA required running a jackknife. The
jackknife procedure involves running the analysis with a case deleted, and then
using the resulting function to classify this case. Once this has been done for all
cases, one has a more robust estimate of the lower bounds of the classification
performance. The results of a jackknife on both the discriminant analysis and the
logistic regression are presented in Table 14, which also summarizes the initial
classification analyses, and the performance of lay evaluators reported above. A
resampling analysis revealed that the overall performance of the expert CBCA
evaluations (including the jackknifed performances) were better than chance,
highest bootstrap p < .03 (lowest p < .001). The performance for false statements
of all expert CBCA evaluations was similarly significantly above chance. Of the
evaluations of true statements, only the logistic regression on expert application
of CBCA was significantly above chance (bootstrap p < .02).
All ways of examining the CBCA classification outcomes yielded
significant correlations between classification and reality. The correlation
between classification decision rendered by the initial discriminant analysis and
statement reality accounted for 63% of the variance in this criterion (r = .79,
p < .001. The least well fitting jackknife accounted for 17% of the variance in the
same criterion (r = .41, p = .031).

99
Table 14: Comparison Summary of Evaluation Performance
STATEMENTS

Percent variance
accounted for

All

All

True

False

Lay Evaluators, No Testimony Exposure

00
a**

EVALUATION

Percent Correct

65%*

63%*

66%*

Lay Evaluators, CBCA Testimony

7%*

6 3 % '*

64%*

63 %*

Lay Evaluators, Counter-CBCA Testimony

2%*

59%*

47%*

68%*

Expert CBCA, Discriminant Analysis

62%*

89 %*

75%

100%*

Expert CBCA, Jackknifed Disc. Analysis

17%*

71 %*

58%

81 %*

Expert CBCA, Logistic Regression

50%*

86%*

83 %*

88%*

Expert CBCA, Jackknifed Log. Regression

31 %*

79 %*

67%

88%*

* Cell performance significantly different from chance,

p <

.05.

Relative Effectiveness of CBCA and Lay Evaluators
Hypothesis 4: Comparison of CBCA and Lay Evaluators
Table 15 summarizes the performance of both Expert arid Lay applications
of CBCA. Lay evaluators did not differ significantly in their performance across
the three testimony conditions. Expert-applied CBCA outperformed lay
evaluators in all testimony conditions. A CBCA bootstrap analysis was
performed to determine whether this higher evaluation accuracy was statistically
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Table l b : Bootstrap Comparisons of Differential Evaluation Performance
LEGEND:

> signifies significant difference, p < .05
= signifies no significant difference
Lay No Testimony > Lay CBCA Testimony = Lay Counter-CBCA

Discriminant Anal. = Logistic Regression > Lay No Testimony > Lay CBCA Testimony = Lay Counter-CBCA
Discriminant Analysis = Logistic Regression - Jackknife Logistic Regression = Jackknife Discriminant Analysis
Jackknife Logistic Regression = Lay No Testimony = Lay CBCA Testimony > Lay Counter-CBCA
Jackknife Discriminant Analysis - Lay No Testimony = Lay CBCA Testimony = Lay Counter-CBCA

significant (the ratios contrasted in the bootstrap analysis are given at the end of
Appendix D). Table 15 displays the contrasts between the differential evaluation
performances found in this research. As can be seen, both the discriminant
analysis and the logistic regression significantly outperform all lay evaluators
(bootstrap p < .05). In a separate contrast just of lay evaluators, no-testimony
subjects perform significantly better than CBCA-testimony subjects (suggesting
that resampling is more powerful than conventional statistics). While both
jackknifed expert applications of CBCA accounted for a substantially higher
portion of the variance than lay evaluators, this was only significantly better than
the lay counter-CBCA testimony evaluation performance. Having a single set of
experts provide a definitive application of CBCA limited to absolute number of
observations and, with small N, statistical significance is not reached as readily.

CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
The present findings suggest that expert testimony in Statement Validity
Assessment (SVA) and its credibility testing approach known as Criteria-Based
Content Analysis (CBCA) is of little utility to lay evaluators. However, they also
indicate that expert application of CBCA is substantially more accurate than lay
evaluators. These findings are examined by first considering the performance of
lay evaluators, and then by reporting on what SVA can offer to persons who
must make credibility assessments with children. Possible reasons for the
ineffectiveness of SVA testimony are explored. Lastly, implications for the
international SVA literature are discussed with a concluding focus on
implications for the U.S. legal system.
Shortcomings of Lay Evaluators
Lay evaluators were found to have three shortcomings. First, they did not
evaluate statements with high accuracy. Second, they were unable to monitor
their own performance ability. Third, they reported beliefs about children's
willingness to lie that are inconsistent with the literature and would tend further
reduce their ability effectively evaluate a given statement.
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Subjects in the present study were asked whether or not a child might lie
about a crime to a police officer. They were able to endorse one of the following
s' tements: children will always/usually/sometimes tell the truth about serious
matters, it depends on the child, and it depends on the situation. A majority of
subjects endorsed the statement "children will usually tell the truth about serious
matters" or the statement "it depends on the child." In contrast, the literature on
children's willingness to lie (e.g., Devitt et ai. 1994) suggests that "children will
sometimes tell the truth about serious matters" is an accurate response. The
literature on children's suggestibility and the nature of children's memory (e.g.,
as reviewed by Ceci & Bruck, 1995) indicates that "it depends on the situation" is
most accurate. Only these two responses are congruent with the scientific
evidence on children about whether a child might lie about a crime to a police
officer. However, less than 40% of subjects in the present study endorsed one of
those two responses. These findings suggest that lay people hold the belief that
children will generally tell the truth and/or they will discount situational factors.
This conclusion is also consistent with the literature. Although the present
findings did not investigate the attribution of dispositions such as "honest" or
"dishonest" to children, such attributions are suggested by their responses in the
present research. This would be lead to an especially devastating outcome for a
generally dishonest child who is making a truthful accusation of abuse, and
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equally devastating outcome for an innocent person falsely accused by a
generally trustworthy child.
As Corder and Whiteside (1.988) demonstrated, actual jurors also hold a
belief that experts can tell whether or not a child has been sexually abused with
near perfect accuracy. However, as research by Brodie (1993) and Ceci and Bruck
(1993,1995) has suggested, experts may well be inaccurate. Clearly more research
on expert accuracy needs to be done, but guild interests of practitioners conspire
against open participation in such research. Furthermore, it would require
considerable funding to conduct a meaningful study as a large number of raters
and statements would need to be used to achieve generalizability. Police
departments, however, may be more open to seeking out techniques for
improving their interviewing and investigative performance (Joffe, 1992/1994).
Clearly, then, the ordinary folk who sit on juries in North America have
beliefs about children that are unsupported by the research. The legal system,
particularly in the U.S., however invests in these people the task of evaluating
the testimony— it is for the jury to evaluate the evidence and determine the truth.
As Lamb (1994) has noted, sexual abuse generally occurs in private with no
witnesses and more often than not there is no penetrative damage or medical
evidence to corroborate a truthful accusation. Thus, it rests upon the evaluation
performance of the lay subject for the courts to correctly convict those
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perpetrators who have been accused, and to free the few innocents who have had
allegations made against them.
However, research suggests the accuracy of lay evaluation of children's
statements is at best weak, slightly but not greatly above chance. In the present
study, the average performance of lay evaluators with no testimony exposure
was 64.5% correct. This is one of the highest findings in the literature. Tye (1994)
found average performance of only 56%. Vrij and van Wijngaarden (1994) and
Westcott, Davies, and Clifford (1991) found accuracy rates also in the mid-50% to
60% range. Others (Joffe, 1992; Ruby, 1995) have also found similar results.
Across a variety of statement types and evaluation conditions in several western
countries, lay evaluators appear to consistently perform about 5%-15% better
than chance. It is particularly important to note that the performance of child
subjects is sometimes worse on statements about a serious, emotionally involving
event than with statements about something as innocuous as whether a child had
a fruit flavored drink.
Even more important is that subjects appear to be unaware of this. This
research found subjects being "som ewhat" to "m ostly" confident of their
evaluations, despite the fact that a performance of 65% correct would hardly be
considered something to be mostly confident about. More subjects indicated that
videotapes were easier to evaluate, however subjects actually performed slightly
better with transcripts. This suggests again that lay evaluators are poor self
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monitors of their abilities. Many lay subjects mentioned that they attended to
body language and looked for "shifty eyes." Given that these are absent in
transcripts and present in videotapes, it would appear that the preferential
techniques of lay evaluators are also the least effective.
Further, there was a near-zero correlation between the accuracy
evaluations and confidence in evaluations, suggesting again that subjects are
relatively unaware of their own performance ability. Imagine the situation on a
jury where a subject who is overly confident may argue his or her opinion and
persuade others, even though evidently lay evaluators have no innate awareness
of how accurate their evaluations are. This near zero relationship is consistent
with that found by other authors. In sum, the evidence clearly shows that
subjects have room to improve their evaluation performance, both through
education in performance-boosting techniques and perhaps through persuasion
to abandon pre-existing but ineffective strategies. How much can SVA help
them?
What SVA and CBCA Mav O ffer
The North American research on children's ability to give reliable
testimony has focused on such global factors as the suggestibility of children and
the extent to which interview techniques such as the use of anatomically detailed
dolls may mislead children. It has focused also on children's memory for
traumatic events and on the decay of memory for both dramatic and trivial
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events over time. The focus of this research can be summed up in three words:
memory, suggestibility, developmental factors. The author suggests that this
represents a paradigm that considers children (emphasis on the plural). The
author further suggests that the best answer such research can offer about the
truthfulness of a particular statement from a particular child is "Maybe. Maybe
not." However, courts do not evaluate children, they evaluate evidence (or at
least are supposed to), and the evidence in question in an abuse case is a child's
statement. German research has focused precisely on statement reality analysis— a
paradigm that generates conclusions about particular statements, of direct
benefit to the investigator seeking to find out what has happened, especially as
appropriate legal and clinical interventions should rest on what has happened.
SVA has been widely used for decades in Germany. In offering a
statement-focused paradigm it avoids the "advocacy sand trap" into which the
author feels he has fallen when reading some of the literature on suggestibility.
Obviously, children vary in suggestibility! But equally obviously, a statement at
hand is either true or false. Experimental studies of CBCA show that witn careful
application by experts well trained in the technique, it is possible to obtain rates
of 85%-100%. The classification performance of CBCA as found in the present
study depended a great deal on the kind of statistical approach used to
determine it. The present study showed accuracy rates in the 80% range, with
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statistically optimized classification being at 89% and statistically most
conservative classification being at 71%.
It has been argued that CBCA may be most easily "tricked" in the case of
perpetrator substitution, because all of the criteria would be present if the child
told things exactly as they had happened except for naming a different actor.
However, in the mock crime scenario statements used here, Perpetrator
Substitution statements had fewer criteria than Fantasy Accusation statements.
Even though children had seen their parents steal a book, and heard a script
identical to the True Accusations, these children were the least likely to give
elaborate, criteria-rich accounts. It is as if, to be sure of not accidentally making a
mistake, they completely avoided the memory of the event and fabricated a total
substitution.
If this holds true for sexual abuse statements, it could be very helpful for
front line caseworkers. In some studies a majority of allegations of abuse are not
confirmed (Faller, 1993). This can occur even if abuse has occurred, such as when
there is insufficient external corroborating evidence. A statement-analysis
approach to investigation would help to ensure that it is rare for a child who has
been abused to come to the attention of child protective services and to be turned
away. The use of SVA would also make it possible to quickly identify possible
cases of perpetrator substitution, such as when there is a weak statement that is
incongruously accompanied by other evidence that point towards abuse.
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Such a wide range of performance is in part due to the lack of definitive
cut-off point for CBCA scoring. To a certain extent there is no solution for this
problem. Undeutsch (1989) has criticized laboratory research because any
ethically created statement of known validity will be substantively different from
actual sexual abuse statements. Steller (1989) has cautioned that to be a
meaningful test of CBCA, a laboratory scenario generating statements must
possess three characteristics: negative emotional tone, loss of control, and direct
involvement of the witness. Raskin and Esplin (1992a) added a fourth
characteristic: the person behaving negatively towards the child should be
someone known and trusted. The Devitt et al. (1994) statements are perhaps the
closest that we can come in the laboratory in terms of satisfying these standardsbut clearly even having a parent steal a book and asking his or her child to lie is
benign compared to sexual abuse.
The discrimination performance of CBCA appears to weaken as these
three (or four) "scenario saliency criteria" are diminished. For example, Joffe
(1992) found that CBCA performed poorly but used statements about having
witnessed a tape recorder malfunction. Steller, Wellerhaus, and Wolf (cited in
Raskin & Esplin, 1992a) also found little difference in CBCA scores when
children were making up stories about a being attacked by a dog or donating
blood. It may be helpful to think of the present statements as at a midpoint
between abuse statements and these. Notwithstanding problems of circular
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classification, studies that use real confirmed and highly doubtful sexual abuse
statements such as Boychuk (1991) and Raskin and Esplin (1992a) have found
almost perfect classification performance. If this continuum indeed exists, then
the present classification performance is exceptionally high for non-abuse
statements. It is argued that future CBCA research should firmly avoid any
statements of lesser scenario saliency than used in the present study.
What CBCA and SVA Do O ffer
While there is much that SVA may offer, one may well ask what does it
offer, today, that has been proven? Indeed, Wells and Loftus (1992) have asked
such a question and critiqued SVA as a technique that still needs to be
experimentally verified. In a general-audience book titled Jeopardy in the
Courtroom, Ceci and Bruck (1995) had this to say about statement validity
assessment:
There is some evidence that professionals can detect outright lies when
children are interviewed immediately after lying about an act to protect a
loved one (Honts, 1994), but much more work remains to be done before
we can be confident about this finding. However, on the basis of the
following evidence, it appears that that trained adults cannot reliably
detect false reports from children who are exposed to repeated suggestive
techniques over long periods of time. (p. 280)
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Ceci and Bruck continued by describing a series of experiments using
expert evaluators such as researchers, judges, and mental health professionals.
Ceci and Bruck made no more than the passing reference to SVA that is quoted
above (not even naming the technique), despite the fact that it has had four
decades of application in tens of thousands of cases in Germany. Their oversight
is not unique, however, as the technique remains little known outside of
Germany. Perhaps it is because of Undeutsch's failure to publish prolifically.
Nevertheless, science is an international endeavor, and perhaps the reader may
excuse this author for not being entirely forgiving of the fact that two of the most
prominent North American child witness researchers failed to devote at least a
chapter to statement validity assessment, in a book they subtitled A Scientific
Analysis of Children's Testimony.
As noted earlier, CBCA itself continues to evolve. For example, Kohnken,
Schimossek, Aschermann, and Hofer (1995) have proposed a supplementary set
of reality analysis criteria which may boost the accuracy of the technique. When
studying research on the accuracy, validity, and reliability of CBCA it is
important to identify what form of the technique the authors are using. It is also
essential to consider the type of statements being used in experiments. An
increasing proportion of research on CBCA applies the technique in novel ways
which are of limited generalizability to child sexual abuse statements. For
example, recent research has applied the technique to adult statements or to
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children's statements generated in scenarios of low emotional saliency. Similarly,
it would be inappropriate to draw conclusions about the reliability of scoring by
examining the scoring of briefly trained evaluators, or even by examining the
scoring of expert evaluators on statements of low emotional saliency. Recent
reviews of statement analysis (e.g., Bekerian and Dennett, 1995) overlook these
considerations.
The laboratory evidence that has been reviewed in this dissertation
suggests that CBCA can discriminate true and false statements, providing that
the statements are of sufficient saliency and that the evaluators are specifically
trained in CBCA. Indeed, in all the experiments where it has been applied to
child sexual abuse statements, it has been perfect in its classification
performance,
It is especially important to note that it has been well established that
social workers, psychologists, and lay evaluators are all quite poor judges of the
truthfulness of children's statements (e.g., Brodie, 1993; Ceci & Bruck, 1995).
Thus, there is clearly a need for a performance improving technique. In addition
to being such a technique, SVA also has much to offer in terms of its interview
system, which may maximize recall while minimizing distortion.
What SVA Did O ffer (to Lay Evaluators in the form of Expert Testimony)
As noted above, lay evaluators performed better than chance but not
enormously so. Given that CBCA performed much better with the same
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statements, one may well ask why exposure to expert testimony about SVA did
not make a difference to their performance. It appears that subjects attended at
least peripherally to the expert testimony, as they were able at the end of the
experiment to recall at least a few of the criteria. Further, subjects who had a
handout accompanying the testimony were able to recall about one more
criterion by the experiment's end. The fact that a counter-CBCA testimony
decreased performance also suggests that subjects were attending to the
materials. In both conditions the overwhelming majority of subjects perceived
the expert to be either "som ewhat" or "very" convincing and competent.
One way of understanding the lack of positive effects for CBCA testimony
exposure is by examining the effects of central and peripheral communications,
as described in Petty and Cacioppo's (1986) Elaboration Likelihood Model of
persuasive communication. Briefly, this cognitive model suggests that there are
two routes to attitude change, central and peripheral. Messages that are
processed centrally will produce the strongest and most durable change,
providing that there is motivation to process the message, available attention,
and also the absence of counter arguments (which can cause a centrally
processed message to be rejected). Otherwise messages are influenced by
peripheral factors such as source credibility, attractiveness, and so forth.
Peripheral attitude change is weaker and more fleeting than attitude change due
to central communications.
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Although the present study is not about persuasion, perhaps expert
testimony in the form used in the present study is somewhere between training
and persuasive communication. Here, the persuasion is not that of a prosecution
or defense witness' opinion, but about the general characteristics of a child's
statement— about persuading a lay evaluator (or juror) to abandon whatever
techniques they would otherwise use (the ones that cause lay evaluators to
perform only a little above chance).
Suppose that people have a set of strategies for evaluating the truthfulness
of statements, and that, furthermore, these strategies are not very effective.
However, they are closely held, like attitudes. The Elaboration Likelihood Model
would predict change to occur only with deep central processing. Accordingly, it
would not be surprising for a testimony from an expert who was viewed as
competent (a peripheral factor) to have little influence on the underlying
attitudes (assessment techniques) unless there was strong motivation to attend to
the message. Although subjects had possible financial rewards for their
performance, the saliency of the experiment might have been weak for them.
While a real juror might benefit more from exposure to expert testimony on SVA,
there is also the possibility that the juror might simply continue to rely on his or
her pie-existing and performance-lowering strategies, such trying to assess the
shiftiness of the witnesses' eyes. (Perhaps there really is a relationship between
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lying and eye movements. No matter, since lay evaluators seem to be unable to
detect it.)
An alternative explanation for the absence of any beneficial influence of
exposure to SVA expert testimony is subject motivation. Perhaps the prize
potential was not sufficiently large, or perhaps subjects were not sufficiently
impressed by the ability of SVA to improve their performance. Landry and
Brigham (1992) found a positive influence of brief training in SVA on lay subject
evaluations. Further research would need to be done to determine if the passive
nature of exposure to expert testimony inherently diminishes its benefits to lay
subjects, or if some motivational factors accounted for the present weak findings.
If motivational factors led to the failure to utilize the SVA testimony, then
the present findings are exceptionally important for prosecutors or defense
attorneys wanting to introduce expert testimony on SVA in actual sexual abuse
cases. For example, Seltzer, Lopes, and Venuti (1990) have noted that jurors fail
to utilize expert testimony about the reliability of eyewitness identification.
Heeding Undeutsch's warning about weak ecological validity, we may wish to
conduct future experiments on SVA expert testimony with circumstances that
more closely approximate jury trials, and with real statements from children
about events of significant emotional saliency. It would also be important to
insist on materials that involve statements of known truthfulness, generated
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under conditions that provided child subjects compelling reason to fabricate or
tell the truth.
Im plications of Present Findings
Lay evaluators do not appear to have been helped by exposure to expert
testimony on CBCA. Given that their performance is generally poor, and that
CBCA's is better, the present findings do not necessarily argue against the
introduction of expert testimony on CBCA in jury trials of sexual abuse cases. Of
course, they also do not make a case in favor of this introduction either. The
present findings suggest that exposure to expert testimony on SVA is at worst
neutral. Manipulations which increased the recall of criteria in lay evaluators did
not increase their accuracy, suggesting that the failure to benefit from expert
testimony is not a function of memory. As noted above, two alternative
explanations are that subjects were unable to apply the criteria, or were
unwilling to apply them. Perhaps the heightened saliency and motivation of real
jury duty may help. Clearly the present findings show that lay evaluators need
assistance, as their native abilities, while better than chance, are not that good.
We should not abandon the idea of helping to improve the abilities of lay
evaluators with expert testimony.
However, the present findings aigue most strongly for the introduction of
SVA in courtroom testimony in the form of expert interpretation of a child's
statement. In just the same manner that a DNA expert presents both educational
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information on what DNA tests mean, and data on the application of those tests
to a particular sample of blood, an expert testifying on SVA would be able to
inform the jury about SVA (as was done with the present testimony materials),
and then apply the technique to a particular child's statement. The author
suggests that this would not be removing the role of trier-of-fact from the juror,
and would be no different than a physician's testimony about the possible causes
of genital trauma.
Given that lay evaluators do not perform terribly well, and especially that
they appear to unaware of when they are performing accurately and when they
are not, it is imperative to begin introducing SVA testimony into U.S. courts of
law. Preferentially child protective service workers would adopt SVA interview
techniques, as used in Germany for decades, and the expert would be called
upon by the prosecution. However, cautioning against rapid introduction of SVA
testimony is the fact that there is as yet no a standardized certification in SVA in
the U.S.. Given the difficulty in learning how to use the technique, such rigorous
certification is an essential prerequisite. Perhaps child protective service agencies
and law enforcement agencies could begin to bring expert German counterparts
to the U.S. to develop a consistent and uniform training program. The fact that
lay evaluators often rate true statements as false speaks to the need for defense
attorneys and prosecutors to both press for the adoption of this technique.

117
Dissertations generally conclude with a call for more research. Not here!
That is to say, more research is called for, but categorically not of the sort of
increasingly prevalent CBCA study that involves either adult statements or child
statements of weak ecological validity. Although many respected authors have
made passing references to SVA and called for more research, a careful reading
of the international literature suggests that the few experiments which use real
statements of abuse have demonstrated the technique to be exceptionally
effective. Those who make passing reference to SVA often state that empirical
studies have found conflicting results as to the accuracy of SVA or the reliability
of expert application of the criteria for child sexual abuse statements. However, if
one reads the literature carefully, it becomes apparent that those studies that cast
doubt on the utility of the technique involve designs that limit the
generalizability of their results to sexual abuse statements. This point cannot be
overemphasized!
There are an increasing number of methodologically challenged designs in
North American CBCA research. The term "training" has been used without
qualification even though the most extensive training used in North American
studies is but a fraction of what is done in Germany. Furthermore, briefly trained
lay evaluators have often been asked to evaluate statements of adults, and the
findings have been used by other authors to question the value of CBCA for
evaluating children's statements. Even research that involves children's
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statem en ts is o f lim ited value if the children have not been given em otion ally
com pelling reason to lie (or, in truthful conditions, tell the truth).
R esearch m ay be visualized as falling on a continuum o f applicability to
child sexual abuse statem ent assessm ent. This continuum w ould be divided into
three sections, as show n in Figure 9. O n the left, w ith the w eakest applicability to
child sexual abuse assessm ent, are those studies that involve ad u lt statem ents. In
the m iddle section are experim ents using non-sexual abuse ch ild ren 's statem ents
o f know n truthfulness, and on the right are studies that use actu al sexual abuse
statem ents. W hile this type of field research is m ost strongly applicable to sexual
abuse investigation s, it alw ays faces the challenge that the truthfu lness o f actual
abuse statem ents cann ot be determ ined.
W ith in the m iddle section o f this continuum there is a g reat range of
applicability (or generalizability) to actual sexual abuse investigations. M any
laboratory studies are on ly w eakly applicable— lim ited b y their use o f statem ents
o f poor qu ality or w eak em otional valid ity— and m ake in appropriate
generalization s from b rief training program s. It w ould be u nfortu nate to draw
conclu sions about S V A 's ability to determ ine the truthfulness o f ch ild ren 's
statem ents from such research. It is nevertheless possible to cond uct sound
laboratory experim ents. O ne area that is especially appropriate for lab oratory
research is the im pact o f developm ental factors and in d ivid u al differen ces on
CBC A .
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Fig u re 9: C o n cep tu al C o n tin u u m o f S V A R esearch

less
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of actual
child sex
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SVA on adult
statements of
known
truthfulness

—

SVA on children’s
statements of known
truthfulness
ffr

—

SVA on child
sexual abuse
statements

*

------- ►
more
applicable to
assessment
of actual
child sex
abuse

A large proportion o f recent research: Statements of
weak ecological validity; inappropriate generalizations
from brief training.
★ The present research:

Emotionally salient scenario generating compelling
statements; appropriate conclusions.

W e m ust rem em ber U n d eu tsch 's concerns about laboratory research and
arrest the d rift in experim ental focus that has occurred. The best directions for
futu re efforts in SV A involve keeping to the strong side o f this applicability
continuum . T his w ou ld include detailing the current use o f the technique in
G erm any, develop ing stand ardized training program s in N orth A m erica, and
further in vestigatin g the u tility o f SV A (including the SV A interview ) w hen used
b y front-line professionals. N ew laboratory research on C BC A m ust focus on
actu al abuse statem en ts and on laboratory generated statem en ts o f high saliency.
R esearchers m ust avoid easy experim ents w ith statem ents of w eak ecological
v alid ity, and review ers m ust be w ary o f incautious generalizations. Statem ent
V alid ity A ssessm ent offers a p ow erful set o f investigative and assessm en t tools
that are greatly needed.

A P P E N D IC E S
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A P P E N D IX A: SA M P L E S T A T E M E N T

T h e r e a d e r is i n v i t e d t o a s s e s s t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f t h i s s t a t e m e n t . T h e l a s t p a g e o f A p p e n d i x D

r e v e a ls th e a n s w e r .

S:

Someone took it. T hat, some guy. He, he was helping me and guess what he, that guy gave me?

I:

W hat?

S:

50 cents. And he stole, he stole the book.

I:

He did? W hy don’t you sit down and tell me about this, < Subject > ? Okay?

S:

He was, he was just helping me, we were doing cards and stuff. And I, and I had to weigh and he was
seeing how fast my heart was beating and if I went very fast, I got 50 cents.

I:

Wow! T h a t’s great!

S:

And then, and then he was going to go and then he just, and that guy came right in and he, and he
said “H ave you guys seen my book, cause I was looking for it?” But, I think they were doing an
experiment. I neat one. I’m gonna get that guy. T hat guy who stole the book, I’m gonna take my
< unclear > and hold them, if I put it on his arm and I buckled it on and he lied on something, he
gets a permanent shock.

I:

Oh. T h at would hurt, wouldn’t it? Okay. Now I want you to tell me more about this book. You said
somebody stole the book, can you tell me more about that?

S:

W hen we first got in, he was reading it, but when he came back in...gone.

I:

It was gone? W h at happened to it?

S:

I...I...I think that guy stole it.

I:

W h ich one?

S:

The guy who was helping me.

I:

Oh. Do you remember what his name was?

S:

W h at was it mom?

I:

Do you remember? It’s okay if you don’t remember.

S:

< shakes head no >

I:

Maybe you’ll think of it. If you think of it you let me know, okay? So, okay, you said that, that this
fellow that was helping you, he stole the book. Can you tell me more about that?

S:

W hen that, when that kid came back, he said, “I’m gonna call the cops.” And he really did. And me
and my mom thought we were, we thought we were supposed to, we didn't know we were supposed
to go to the to the police station.

I:

It was a surprise, huh? W ell, it’s a serious thing when somebody steals a book. C an you tell me,
< Subject > , everything that happened from the time that you arrived until you came over here?
Can you remember and tell me everything that happened?

I

I
b
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S:

First, when I just came in he was reading it, and the lady said that I’m gonna have a ’spearmint. So,
they went, first, I went to stand on the scale and then he was going get my, he was doing this
< shows action of taking the pulse > to see how fast my heart was beating. Then, and then he took
me to the where the card games were and then, then, once I got to do it slow. But the 2nd time I
had to do it super fast, and I did and I got these money. And then he went, he went, and that, and
then he just came in and book was gone.

I:

It was gone, huh? Did you see what happened to the book?

S:

I saw, I saw him holding the book and and and just walked away.

I:

Then what happened?

S:

T h a t’s the whole thing I saw remember.

I:

Anything happen after you played the card game and you got the 50 cents?

S:

Then he just left.

I:

He left? W ho left?

S:

That guy who was helping me.

I:

Okay. And then what happened?

S:

I can ’t remember that.

I:

Okay, just think.

S:

He didn’t. I saw him taking the book home.

I:

Okay.

S:

He was walking down and then I < u tc l e a r > . T h a t’s the only thing I can remember.

I:

W here you in the room alone?

S:

U h uh. My mom and a lady and that guy was there.

I:

Okay. W as your mom and that lady and everybody in the room all at the same time?

S:

U m hum. But not that guy, not that kid who was, he had, he’s having a big test tomorrow. So he
should, you know, get that book.

I:

But, can you remember the name of the guy who was working with you?

S:

< shakes head no >

I:

C an you tell me what he looked like?

S:

He looked like, he had a little beard, that < unclear > and he said to me. Now I remember one
thing. After the card game he haded me draw, but the only thing I know how to draw is pirate ships.

I:

T hat sounds like fun.

S:

T h at’s what I want to be when I grow up... a pirate.

I:

Okay. So he had you draw? W hat happened after you drew?

S:

T hen, then he talked to me and then then he went.

I:

Do you remember what he said to you when he talked to you?

S:

W hat my favorite show was, and what my favorite food was, and the rest.

i?

<■

a
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I
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I:

C an you remember anything else? You said somebody come back in the room.

S:

T hat same kid he was he was in there when I just came in, he was sitting down and reading. But all
the books he found was his writing book. T h at’s all. 1 found my writing book, mom. 1 found it. I
have, I have a writing book at my house.

I:

Okay. T h a t’s good. Okay, there’s something I’m gonna have to ask you because I’m a little bit
confused. You said that, you said that you...Did you see the book when you first went into the room?

S:

U m hmm.

I:

Do you remember what the book looked like?

S:

Yep...I ..uh uh < shakes head n o > .

I:

You just think about it for a second.

S:

It had words. I couldn’t read it because I’m in first grade, but I can ’t < unclear > . < unclear > only
thing I remember.

I:

Do you remember what color it was?

S:

I remember it was gray. It was gray. And yellow. And brown. And red. It was all different colors.

I:

Okay. And then you started talking about this guy who was working with you. You said he had a
beard. Can you tell me anything else about him?

S:

U m , um, I can’t remember.

I:

Okay.

S:

Do you have any candy bars, have you got any candy machines anywhere?

I:

W ell, not right in here, but maybe after a little while we’ll see if we can find something for you.

S:

Because this is, I’m trying to same these things so I can get a candy. But at the school the candy
machine, it didn’t work. It never took one of my quarters. And we were, and my mom was trying to
get that candy bar out. < unclear >

I:

O h, dam it. Okay. Now. You said the guy whose book was gone, he came back into the room. W hat
happened then?

S:

He just said, “Has anybody seen my book?” W e never seen it and I was looking for it. I told my mom
to get up so I could look. Hay, mom, remember that guy? He must’ve took the book and hided it
right under the mattress or something I can’t remember.

I:

Did you see somebody take the book?

S:

Huh uh. < shakes head no >

I:

No? You didn’t see anybody take the book?

S:

Huh uh, all I, I just seed his writing book, th at’s all I saw.

1:

Okay, but you didn’t see any, any, see where the book went?

S:

No.

I:

Okay. C an you remember anything else?

S:

Huh uh. < shakes head no >

I:

< debriefing >

A P P E N D IX B : E X P E R T T E S T IM O N Y

Would you lease state your name and address for the record?
It’s Charles Robert Honts. H-O-N-T-S. I live at twenty-two sixty three Springbrook Court, Grand
Forks, ND.
W h at is your occupation?
I am an Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of North Dakota.
W h at is your educational background?
I have a bachelors degree in Experimental Psychology from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University in Blacksburg, Virginia. I received a Masters of Science in Psychology from that same
institution, in 1 9 8 2 .1 hold a Ph.D. in Experimental Psychology from the University of U tah which
I received in 1986.
A re you a clinical psychologist?
No, I am an experimental psychologist.
Can you work in the field of psychology without being a clinical psychologist?
Absolutely. Clinical psychology is only a small part of the field of psychology.
Do you concentrate your work in any particular area?
Yes, over the last few years, my work has been concentrated in the area of psychology and the law. I
am particularly interested in how psychology can offer techniques that may be of use in the legal
system.
Do you have any specialized training in this area?
In several areas. I have been trained as a polygraph examiner since 1976, have done a fair amount
of research in that area and have been to numerous advance seminars and workshops in that area. I
have also been trained in techniques for interviewing and assessing the credibility of children,
techniques that came to us from Germany, and I have been trained by the people who originated
those techniques in Germany.
Have you published any writings regarding credibility assessment?
Quite a few. I have over a hundred publications and papers on credibility assessment with children
and adults.
Have you done any consultations for public agencies regarding credibility assessment?
Yes. I worked with quite a few government agencies, agencies of the federal government. I have
worked with the U .S . Secret Service, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, the Naval
Investigative Service, the Central Intelligence Agency. I also do quite a bit of work with the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police in Canada.
Do have any professional licenses?
Yes, I am licensed as a polygraph examiner in the State of North Dakota.
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I:

Do you belong to any professional associations?

E:

Quite a few. I am member, a charter member, of the American Psychological Society, which is the
largest organization of experimental psychologists. I am a member of the Society for
Psychophysiological Research, I am a member of American Psychology and Law Society, and 1 am a
member of the Rocky Mountain Psychological Association.

I:

You said earlier that you were familiar with the credibility assessment of children’s statements. Will
you please explain to me what that is?

E:

W ell, yes. There are a set of techniques that are relatively new in the English speaking world but
which have been around in Germany and in Sweden for about thirty years. I became familiar with
these techniques in the middle nineteen eighties. They are a set of techniques that are designed to
be used with the child witness, in an effort to develop information about what the child witness
knows and then to assess whether the child’s statement is credible or not.

I:

How exactly does this process work?

E:

W ell, the technique, which is known as Statement Validity Assessment has three phases. In the
first phase an interview is conducted. It’s a very special kind of interview, it’s a structured
interview, it’s designed to raise the child to the child’s highest level of functioning. It’s designed
specifically to develop information, it is not therapy. It’s a forensic investigative interview. W e
know from decades of psychological research that the most accurate information can be obtained
from statements that are given from free recall. And, so the interview is oriented to generate as
much memory from recall as possible. And so the interview is designed to produce as long as
possible a free narrative statement by the child. The interview then moves through a structure to
progressively more and more pointed questioning and the entire approach is one of hypothesis
testing. That is to say, initially the investigator who is doing the interview will form a series of
alternative hypotheses about the case. For example, in a child sex abuse you might consider several
hypotheses. One is obviously that the child is telling the truth, another might be that the child is
basically telling the truth but has substituted a different perpetrator because the motivational
situation is such that the actual perpetrator is too threatening, and so a less threatening person is
named as the perpetrator. The child may have given a completely false statement because some
other powerful adult has influenced the child to make a false statement. Yet another alternative
hypothesis might be that the child for his or her own motives has come up with a false statement
perhaps to get revenge or get even, or perhaps of because of psychological problems. So, working
from this approach of having multiple hypotheses, the interview is designed to collect data to
decide which of those hypotheses is the most likely.

I:

In this interview process what sort of questions do you start with?

E:

W ell, the interview begins with very open ended questions, that is you might say, to the child that
“I understand that there have been some problems at your home, can you tell me about that?” And
so it’s not suggested but it opens the stage and should begin to generate a free narrative. And the
idea is to always ask very open ended questions and to lead the child as little as possible.

I:

Do you ever use any sort of leading questions in your interview process?

E:

Usually not. If there are important issues that are unresolved the questioning becomes progressively
more focused. T he only time we would use very leading or suggestive questions would be at the very
end of the interview. If the interviewer has decided that one of the likely alternatives is that the
child’s accusations have been suggested by an adult, then you might try leading questions at that
point just to get a feel for how suggestible this particular child is. T hat is not completely diagnostic
because the child could be telling the truth and be suggestible, or the child could be lying and resist
suggestion. But, it is suggestive.
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I:

You said there were three phases. The first was the interview phase, what is the second phase?

E:

Yes, the second part is the statement analysis process. These interviews are always videotaped. Once
the interview is completed, the interview will be transcribed and then there’s a credibility
assessment procedure th at’s engaged in with the transcribed interview. T hat is called criteria based
content analysis, or C -B-C-A for short. W hat is done in C B C A is that you look for certain
characteristics of a statement that are indicative of truthful statements. This is based on a
hypothesis that was derived by a German psychologist in the nineteen fifties. And if we can, I’ll go
to our some of the materials that I have to help ease my talk along. [Un ' tsch Hypothesis
overhead displayed.] The German psychologist who came up with this notion is called Undeutsch.
He is one of the psychologists who has trained me in this technique. It is based on a relatively
simple notion that is known as the Undeutsch hypothesis. And that hypothesis says that statements
derived from memories of actual experience differ in content and quality from statements based on
invention or fantasy. The idea is that when we recount memories that are true memories, they will
qualitatively different than the kind of statements that we make if we are fantasizing or we are
deliberately lying about what we have to say. The approach in C B C A is to look specifically for
those criteria that are indicative of a truthful statement.

I:

W h at are some of these criteria?

E:

There are a number of them that we look for. They fall into three general categories. There are
three that are basic general characteristics of statements. [Begin display of criteria overheads.] The
first is one is that statement has logical structure. T hat is, does the statement make sense? T hat does
not mean that the statement goes A-B-C-D'E-F, it just means that as we look back on it, does it
make sense? Is it logical? Could it have happened? That is a basic requirement. If the statement
doesn’t have logical structure you’re going to be very skeptical of it. The second criterion is called
unstructured production. And, this one is a is a little bit counter intuitive. But, we know that when
we recall things from memory, memory is not like a videotape. W hen we remember things that
have happened to us it’s not like we are playing a movie. W e remember important things first and
then as we are going through the process of remembering we remember other things, there are
details. The order of memory is rarely A -B'C'D -E-F. It’s far more often likely to be B-D -EF-A -G .
But, at the end if you look at the statement in it’s entirety, we can piece it back together. O n the
other hand if we’re telling a story that is not the truth, one of the things that you have to do when
you are telling untruth is that you have to keep it straight. The basic way of keeping it straight is to
organize it so that you tell it A-B-C-D-E-F, that way you don’t get confused and you tell the story
straight ahead. And so the second thing we look for in terms of general characteristics is that the
statement be somewhat unstructured, that there be some moving back and forth in some
inconsistency in the chronolog' in that sense that the person jumps around a little bit.

I:

Go ahead.

E:

T he third general characteristic is that we look for quantity of detail. Our memories tend to be
fairly rich we remember things not only central specific items, but we remember peripheral details,
we remember how we felt, and that people’s memories tend to be quite rich, in that you tend to see
a fair production in detail associated with true statements.

I:

W h at are the other things that you look for?

E:

W ell, we move on from the general characteristics of the statement to more specific contents.
These are things that don’t occur in every statement but when they occur they can be very powerful
indicators that it is a truthful statement. And let me reemphasize that all of these criteria are things
that are reinforcing that the statement is truthful. So these are things we expect to see in true
memories. These criteria begin with one called contextual embedding. Everything that happens
happens in a certain context. It happens in a place and at a certain time. And one of the things
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that comes out when we tell about things we have actually experienced is we embed them in a
specific place and time. W e expect to see descriptions of interactions, and this has a very specific
definition for us in this analysis in that it requires at least three elements. So in a statement we
expect the child to say “He did this—I did that—he did something—I did something” before this
criteria is met. W e want to see the action move back and forth. And again this is something that is
characteristic of true memory but does not seem to be very characteristic of stories that people make
up. False stories typically have a one person kind of perspective “He did this—he did that—he did
the other," rather than seeing the action move back and forth as it actually does in a true incident.
Similarly the sixth one is reproduction of speech. Human beings are verbal, there is almost always
conversation that goes on, even in instances of abuse. And, one of the things that happens when
you hear a child talk about an actual experience is that they reproduce speech. So we look in the
statement to find places where there should be quotation marks. “He said this, I said that, he said
something else."
The next group I think are fairly self explanatory. W e look for anything in the statement that is
unexpected. If we’re telling a story that is not the truth we are not going to complicate with
unexpected things. And yet, in the real world unexpected things happen all the time. Some
incident happens that interrupts one of the episodes of abuse. Some accident occurs, something
unexpected will be in the statement—it’s not the kind of thing you would make up to put in a
statement if you weren’t telling the truth. These don’t happen all the time, but when they happen
they are very persuasive. Unusual details are a similar thing. Unusual events are not the kind of
things you would make up but nevertheless are things that are plausible and that make sense to us.
Number nine, superfluous details, refers to information that are the kinds of things that get stuck in
our memory but they’re not necessary for the action of the story. Children often remember what
they were wearing or they remember lighting in the room or the weather on that particular day.
Those kinds of things don’t really matter for retelling the story of abuse and you’re unlikely to have
added them if you were making that story up. But they are the very kinds of things that get attached
to our real memories. Ten, another one I think that is fairly obvious, is accurately recorded details
that are misunderstood. Again, these don’t occur with high frequency, but when they occur they are
very persuasive that you have a true statement. In this case the child describes an event accurately
and to us as adults with sexual knowledge the descriptions make good sense, but the child clearly
does not understand what has happened. And yet they have given us an accurate description of
something that they clearly don’t understand. Again, that could clearly be a very powerful indicator
although it does not seem to happen with that much frequency. Related external associations would
refer to events that happen in the context that show that it is a context of a sexual nature. For
example, the discussion of sexual events that are not related directly related to the abuse. Perhaps
the use of pornography. O ther things that might not be added to if you were making the statement
up but that support the accuracy of the statement by developing it. Number twelve is an important
one. Our research shows that this one is very diagnostic. Human beings are verbal but we’re also
very affective. W e have an important emotional life, and a big part of our memories is how we felt
when certain things were going on. Sexual abuse is often traumatic for the children, they may be
afraid, angry, anxious—those emotions get attached to the memory, to the real memories. And, one
of the things that frequently comes out when we are talking about real memories is how we felt.
And so, we see that th at’s a strong indicator that it's a truthful statement. T he research indicates
that this is rarely attached to false statements. Similarly, another thing we do as human beings is
that we try to figure out what is going on in the minds of other people. W e are constantly making
attributions about why other people do things. One of the things that we find in true statements is
that there will be attributions of the accused’s mental state. T hat is the child will make attributions
about why the perpetrator did the things that the perpetrator did. Again, this in not something that
we expect to see if the child making up the story or has been coached to give a story.

128
The final category of criteria are called motivation related contents, and they have to do with
things that a lying person is unlikely to do because they call attention to the fact that you might be
lying. And yet they are things that people often do when they are recounting true memories,
because memories are fallible and it is not unexpected that you will forget certain details, and
children are often very nervous that they will not be believed. These criteria involve things like
spontaneous corrections of the story so the child says something and realizes that he or she has
made a mistake, and they go back and spontaneously fix the mistake. If you're lying, you are very
unlikely to do that because it calls attention to the fact that you have made mistakes. A n example
of admitting lack of memory or knowledge would be a child saying “You know, I really want to
remember what happened then but, I just don’t remember th a t.” This would be a spontaneous
admitting a lack of memory. Simply answering a question, a direct question, with “1 don’t know” is
not sufficient to meet this criterion. This criterion requires a spontaneous admission of a lack of
memory of knowledge. People who have been abused, children who have been abused, often are
concerned that they won’t be believed. And, they will say things like “I know this sounds really
bizarre, no one’s going to believe this really happened to me, but it really did.” Again, a person who
is not telling the truth is unlikely to say those kind of things, because it calls attention to the fact
that the story might not be truthful. Criterion seventeen is self-deprecation. Victims often blame
themselves. Or on the other hand, if you’re not telling the truth, you are unlikely to blame yourself.
You’re unlikely to call attention to yourself in that way. So if we see elements in the statement
where the child partially blames themselves for this having occurred, th at’s taken as an indication
that the statement likely to be credible. Another thing that often happens is that the child will
often pardon the accused and try to make excuses for why the accused did the things the accused
did, particularly if it’s a family member, because the child may feel very uncomfortable about the
fact that these proceedings may result in a family member being put in jail or taken out of the home
or whatever. But on the other hand we don’t expect to see that in a child who’s making up a story.
So all of these things these eighteen criteria are things we expect to see in a statement when the
statement is true. It’s not required that all of them be present, in fact it would be extremely rare for
all of them to be present, but you want to see a preponderance of these things being present in
order to conclude that a statement is truthful.
I:

Is there a scoring system for determining whether the statement is true?

E:

Yes there is. There is a check list that you have at hand when you’re going through the transcript.
As you find the criteria carefully reading through the transcript, you make notes. W e use a format
very much like lawyers do in preparing transcripts where the lines are numbered and so we’ll write
down the line numbers where these criteria occur and then we assign scores on a three point scale.
A criterion can be either absent, present, or strongly present. So, if it’s absent, that means we saw
no sign that it occurred anywhere in the statement. If it occurs we assign a one. If we found it, and
if it is a very strong occurrence that fits the definition for the criteria perfectly, then we would
assign a two. So for each criterion there are three possible scores, Zero, if it’s absent, One if it’s
present, or Two if it’s strongly present. Even if a criterion occurs many times, it can ’t get a score
higher than two.

I:

How many interviews should be performed on the child?

E:

W ell, ideally only one. The Germans believe, and I think this is based in good science, that the first
person to actually interview has the best chance of getting an accurate statement. Their approach is
that if you do the job right the first time, and you have the documentation in the form of a
recording of the interview, one interview is all th at’s necessary. And they feel that multiple
interviewing is dangerous, and there is fair amount of scientific research to support that contention.

I:

Will the assessment be effective if it’s the second or third interview of the child?
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E:

T h a t’s difficult to know. T hat is a concern. There is some recent research from the University of
Tennessee at Chattanooga that suggests that even after a series of misleading interviews, of
suggestive and leading and very poor quality interviews, that if you do a good job of interviewing a
child, it’s still possible to get back to the actual memory. And so, I don’t think that the science is
closed on that issue, but I think it is suggestive that this approach works even after a couple of bad
interviews.

I:

Is there anything else about the three phases?

E:

W ell, we haven’t talked about the third phase at all. [Checklist overhead displayed.] The third
phase involves going back and looking at the entire interview and context of the statement in
perspective. And that involves assessing a number of things that may have impacted on the quality
of the C B C A . It also looks at the child’s motives. Initially there are psychological characteristics of
the child that you want to take a look at and take into consideration. Does the child have cognitive
or emotional limitations that would have made it difficult for him or her to have given you a
statement that would be high quality? So if the child is relatively nonverbal or extremely young,
you would take that into account when you evaluate the results of the C B C A . On the other hand,
if the child appears to be capable—that is, verbal and able to give detailed descriptions of things—
and you get a low score on the C B C A , th at’s evidence that the C B C A is predictive. Did the child
use language and knowledge that are appropriate for a child of that age and if they didn’t, where
would that language have come from? In some homes it’s normal to use adult or medical like terms
for the genitalia and so on. In other homes it would be very unusual, and th at’s something that you
would take into consideration. W h at is the child’s affect like? W as the child appropriately serious
about matters that the child should have been serious about, or was there inappropriate affect
displayed during the interview? Was the child flat about things that should have been very
distressing? W as the child happy about things that should have made the child anxious? Those are
all things you’d like to take into consideration. Is there evidence that the child is suggestible? And,
if so, are there possible sources of suggestion in the child’s case history? Was there an interview at
one point that was highly suggestive? Is there an important adult figure who might possibly have led
the child to say things that weren’t true? So again, these are sort of checks on what you see coming
out of the C B C A . W e also want to ask some questions about the interview that you’re assessing and
also about other interviews. The interview that you’re assessing—was it adequate? Does it meet the
standards for applying this technique, that is, do you have free narrative? W as the interview leading
or suggestive? W ere there other interviews that were leading or suggestive that might have resulted
in what you have in front of you when you do this particular analysis. So, those are things that we
look at and that we would take into account. W e also want to look at the motivational context of
the accusation. T hat is, what are the motives for this child reporting? W hen you are assessing the
alternative hypothesis, does this child have a motive for not telling the truth? A re there powerful
adults in this situation who might have influenced this child? Does the child have something to
gain by making a false statement? W hat was the context of the original disclosure? Is this something
that happens spontaneously? For example, did the child go to one of it’s parents and say,
“Something’s happened to me, I’m frightened, so and so scared m e” and then the accusation came
out in that context? O r did it come out in the context of a heavy handed, lead;ng and suggestive
interview? So, we would want to take that into account, and of course the influence of others which
I have already mentioned. A re there others who might have suggested, coached, or pressured the
child to make a statement? And then finally, there are some investigative questions that we would
want to take into consideration at the end of this process. Is the story that the child has told
realistic? Are there elements in the story, important elements, that are simply not possible, that
may violate the laws of nature? Are there contradictions in the statement or statements? And by
this I am not concerned about contradictions about peripheral elements. W e know that people
remember things like colors and counts very poorly. Are there contradictions though about critical
elements, elements of behavior that are important for the statement, things that are unlikely to
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have been misremembered? And finally, does the statement have characteristics that are typical of
this kind of offense? W e know from many years of psychological research that there are certain
elements that are characteristic of child sexual abuse. Usually there are threats, promises, secrets are
kept, there are certain elements about progression, and so on. For example, incest typically begins
with touching, and then progresses to more and more serious acts before intercourse actually takes
place. It is very unusual in an incest situation for the first sexual contact to be full sexual
intercourse. And so those are all things that we want to take into account when we evaluate the
C B C A . The C B C A is not the final answer but it’s an important part of the picture, and basically
here we’re looking to find out whether there is some reason to question the C B C A , or if we have
elements that support its conclusions.
I:

Is there anything else which should be mentioned regarding credibility assessment?

E:

I think we’ve described the process fairly well.

I:

Is this a new field?

E:

It’s a new field in the English speaking world. It’s not a new field in psychology. It’s been around in
Germany since the early nineteen fifties. Undeutsch testified in German courts for the first time in,
I believe it was in 1954. And they were lucky I think, in the sense that German courts looked at it,
and it went all the way to the supreme court in Germany. They not only looked at it, but they
mandated it. And so it’s been a requirement in the German court system since 1955. On the other
hand, since it was admissible and acceptable in Germany, in fact, since it has been mandated since
1955, there has been relatively little research. They didn’t write about it very much and they didn’t
do a lot of research. So the research in the area is a fairly a new phenomena and primarily an
English language phenomena.

I:

Can this theory be tested?

E:

Yes it can. In fact I’ve been involved in doing some of that validation research. W e have done some
of that at the University of North Dakota. And there are roughly two approaches to how you would
go about testing this theory.

I:

W h at are those two approaches?

E:

W ell, the two approaches that you can take I think are typical of science and how science goes
about validating new ideas and notions. W e can do things in the laboratory, and scientists like to
work in the laboratory because in the laboratory we have good solid control over the things that we
do. T he other place that you do validation research is in the field. Obviously we want to know how
accurate this is with children who have been sexually abused. W e can’t sexually abuse children in
the laboratory for obvious ethical reasons and so we have to do other kinds of things in the
laboratory.

I:

W h at kinds of tests are these?

E:

W ell, there are several studies in the literature that have taken the field approach, these are not
studies that I have done but they are studies that I am familiar with. I know the researchers who did
the work that involve actual cases of child sexual abuse. The difficulty in doing that kind of
research is in developing the criterion that tells you who was abused and who was not. And so what
these investigators looked for was to find cases where the alleged perpetrators actually confessed to
having committed the abuse. T h a t’s not a perfect criterion because occasionally innocent people do
confess to crimes. But it’s a pretty good one. And so you can look at those cases with a fair amount
of confidence that the children in those cases are actually telling the truth when they say that this
perpetrator abused them. Far more difficult is coming up with a criterion for false statements. One,
because false statements are less frequent, much less frequent. And then two, because demonstrating
that is not easy. And so the approach th at’s been taken in the published studies is one of using

I
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multiple criteria. And in those studies they basically have required that two of three things be
present. One would be that the child recants the allegation of abuse. And of course that is
problematic because children do sometimes make false recantations. And so along with that they
wanted the alleged perpetrator either to have taken and passed the polygraph test, or for there to
have been a lack of physical evidence when there should have been physical evidence. So if there
was an allegation of full penetration there should be some physical evidence of that and if there was
none that was considered an element of the three that would be used as a criteria. Based on that
research C B C A was shown to be an extremely good discriminator of supported versus questionable
statements in both of those published studies.
A t the University of North Dakota we have taken a somewhat different approach. Rather than
working in the field where we have this difficulty with the criterion, we’ve decided to use the
laboratory approach. And although we can ’t look specifically at child abuse, we’ve come up with a
paradigm we think is very similar in many regards and that involves the child in an act that the
child believes is real and is emotionally involving and involves serious matters. In a study we just
finished recently we had three conditions. The first condition is a condition where the child is
telling the truth. In that condition the children are told they are being brought to the University to
take some psychological tests. They come with the parent, the parent is actually working for us at
this point, because we recruited the parent to be part of our research team. There they are met by
two psychologists, they go into a laboratory and the parent goes off with one of the researchers
while the second researcher starts giving the child some tests. W hen they first arrive in this room,
there is an unexpected complication. There is student in the room studying, and the researcher asks
the student to leave. There is some discussion about the student who would like to study in that
room—can the student come back later—the researchers agree and the student leaves all of his or
her possessions in the room. So the child is being tested. W e do some very simple psychological
tests like sorting cards and drawing pictures. And, at some point the parent and researcher number
one leave the room. The child and researcher two are left alone in the room together, and at some
point researcher two goes over and looks through the student’s possessions, finds a book—and we
have this scripted so that everybody gets exposed to the same statements and same acts—and says
that it’s a nice book and that he or she is going to take it. And then he or she asks the child not to
tell anyone. Mom and the other researcher come back, researcher two leaves with the book, a few
minutes later the student returns, a big dramatic scene ensues, the student says “My book is gone!
W here did my book go? It cost me forty-five dollars I’ve got an exam tomorrow, this is awful!” The
student looks at the child and says, “Do you know who took my book?” Under those circumstances,
with the perpetrator gone, most children will make an accusation at that point. They’ll say that
researcher two took the book, whoever that may have been that day. And, at that point the student
goes, “This is just awful, I’m going to call the police.” W e had two waves of data collection, in the
first wave of data collection we took the children and their parents over to the campus police
station and we actually interviewed them at the police station. One of my graduate students did the
interviews, but the children were led to believe that the person was a police officer. And so we did a
statement analysis style interview, a very open ended interview designed to elicit as much free
narrative as possible. There were two other conditions in this study that were designed to model,
that is mimic the two kinds of false accusations that are made in the real world. In one of those
conditions the book just disappears. No one knows what happens to it, it’s just gone. T he student
returns, gets very upset, and in that condition walks up and accuses the parent of having stolen the
book. The parent is left alone in the room with the child and looks at the child and says, “This is
awful, they’ve called the police, they think I’ve stolen the book, I'm in terrible trouble, when the
police come, why don’t you tell them that researcher two took the book?” T h a t’s it, nothing else is
said and the children aren’t coached, they’re just given a strong suggestion that they should falsely
accuse researcher two. About two thirds of the children do falsely accuse researcher rwo in that
condition. And they were then given a statement analysis interview, and they do give statements
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about researcher two stealing the book. W e think that th at’s a model of when a child just fantasizes
a statement. So they just sort of make it up out of whole cloth. They haven’t actually witnessed
anything but they make it up as best they can. In the third condition, which we believe is a model
for a perpetrator substitution sort of a setting, it’s exactly like the first condition except that
researcher two doesn’t steal the book, the parent steals the book, and says exactly the same things
that researcher two does—about how it’s a nice book, that he or she will take it, and asks the child
not to tell anyone. The parent then takes the book and tells the child that if anyone asks to say that
researcher two took the book, so that the parent won’t get in trouble. So the children have
witnessed everything that the children in the true situation have witnessed, except there is a
different perpetrator. Again, the student arrives, there’s a scene, the police are called, and the
children are interviewed.
W e then took the statements that resulted from these three conditions, and we had people who
were trained to do C B C A evaluate them without any knowledge of who was telling the truth and
who wasn’t. W e also took the videotapes and the transcripts and showed them to a large number of
average people and just asked them, “Just listen to this and can you tell us who is telling us the
truth and who isn’t?” The results of that study indicated: one, that the average person is not much
better than chance at discriminating between true and false statements that are given under these
circumstances. C B C A on the other hand performed quite well, based on the scorings that I
described earlier, it correctly classified all of the false statements. It did make a few errors, and the
few errors that it made were with children who were telling the truth, and there were a few children
in that condition who didn’t want to talk about it and gave very brief very impoverished
statements. And so it made a few errors, the scientists would call them false positive errors, that is it
falsely mistook some of the truthful children for not telling the truth. But the error rate is relatively
small, about fifteen percent. One of my hats is as a statistician, and when we applied multivariate
statistical techniques, we were able to get the accuracy rate up to a hundred percent. So at least in
this laboratory setting, and under those control conditions, C B C A looks like a very powerful
discriminator of truth telling and deception.
I:

Has this been subject to peer review?

E:

Yes it has.

I:

And what was the result of that?

E:

There are several published studies in the peer reviewed literature, there are two publications in the
a n d H u m a n B e h a v i o r , which is a first line psychology journal of the American
Psychological Association. There is a publication in the J o u r n a l o f B e h a v i o r a l Assessment which again
is again a first line publication, peer reviewed. And there a have been a number of papers given at
the Am erican Psychology and Law Society, and the Society for Research in Child Development
meetings, one of which I gave recently. And those are also peer reviewed before they’re accepted.

Jo u rn al o f L aw

I:

W ho would be the relevant scientific community for this field?

E:

I believe that the relevant scientific community here would probably be the group of psychologists
who belong to the American Psychology and Law Society, because they are scientists who are
trained to evaluate scientific research but they also have an appreciation for legal issues, and they’re
very familiar with research in this area, because most of it has been published in psychology and law
oriented journals.

I:

Has this theory been generally accepted by this group?

E:

I don’t know of any surveys that have been taken, but I know at the last Am erican Psychology and
Law meetings there was no negative comm ent when these papers were given.

I:

How many times have you testified in court as a psychologist?

I
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Sixteen I believe.
How many times have you testified specifically on the subject of credibility assessment?
Twice.
How much are you compensated for your time?
For work that I do in my office in Grand Forks, I get a hundred and twenty five dollars and hour.
And then when I travel out of town it’s twelve hundred and fifty dollars a day.
Thank you, I have no further questions.

A P P E N D IX C: E X P E R IM E N T A L M A T E R IA L S
C onsent Form
(all m aterials have been reduced to fit)
The goal of this study is to experimentally evaluate how well people can judge the truthfulness of
statements of children. Some subjects may receive training in various techniques which we are looking at to
see if this can improve the ability of subjects to evaluate the statements of children.
The ultimate benefit of this is to see if we can help ordinary people do a better job if they are ever on a
jury.
Y ou may first receive training in an evaluation technique by watching an expert testify in court. This
training makes reference to certain characteristics of true and false statements, and may include reference to
child sex abuse allegations. Some subjects receive no special training.
Then, you will watch videotapes and read transcripts of children making testimonies about the theft of a
book. Y ou will judge whether the child is telling the truth or not. Some of the testimonies contain true
allegations about who stole a book, some contain false allegations.
Participating in this study will assist in important and interesting research in psychology and law, and will
give you the chance to learn more about this topic as well as about experimental psychology. If you are
uncomfortable at any time, you may leave.
Subjects may also, if they wish, compete for a $50 prize based on the accuracy of their evaluations of the
testimonies about the theft of a book. Additionally, subjects who were in training conditions may compete
for another $50 prize based on the accuracy of their mem ory of the training, measured after the evaluations
of the testimonies are complete.

(S ig n a tu r e a b o v e c e r tifie s l a m

1 8 y e a r s o f a g e o r o v e r a n d h a v e r e a d a n d u n d e r s to o d th e a b o v e .)

If you have any questions, you may contact the investigator, Marcus Choi Tye, at 777-4348 or leave a
message for him at 777-3451.
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C BC A T estim on y H andout

F eelfr e e to

w r ite o n

th is s h eet. N o te : p le a s e r e tu r n

it a ft e r fin is h in g y o u r e v a lu a tio n s .

CHARACTERISTICS O F A TRUE STATEMENT

Criteria for Analyzing General Characteristics
Logical structure
Unstructured production
Quantity of details
C rite ria fo r A nalyzing Specific C o n ten ts
Contextual embedding
Descriptions of interactions
Reproduction of conversation
Unexpected complications during the incident

Criteria for Analyzing Peculiarities of Content
Unusual details
Superfluous details
Accurately reported details misunderstood
Related external associations
Accounts of subjective mental state
Attribution of perpetrator’s mental state

Criteria for Analyzing Content Related to Motivation
Spontaneous corrections
Admitting lack of memory
Raising doubts about one’s own testimony
Self-deprecation
Pardoning the perpetrator

Criteria for Analvzine Offense-Specific Elements of Content
Details characteristic of the offense
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C ou nter-C B C A T estim ony H andout

F e e lf r e e to

w r ite o n

th is sh eet. N o te : p le a s e r e tu r n

it a ft e r fin is h in g y o u r e v a lu a tio n s .

CHARACTERISTICS O F A FALSE STATEMENT

Criteria for Analyzing General Characteristics
Logical structure
Unstructured production
Quantity of details

Criteria for Analyzing Specific Contents
Contextual embedding
Descriptions of interactions
Reproduction of conversation
Unexpected complications during the incident

Criteria for Analyzing Peculiarities of Content
Unusual details
Superfluous details
Accurately reported details misunderstood
Related external associations
Accounts of subjective mental state
Attribution of perpetrator’s mental state

Criteria for Analyzing Content Related to Motivation
Spontaneous corrections
Admitting lack of memory
Raising doubts about one’s own testimony
Self-deprecation
Pardoning the perpetrator

Criteria for Analyzing Offense-Specific Elements of Content
Details characteristic of the offense
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V erbal In structions at Start o f Session
(from testim ony condition)

“This is an experiment on credibility assessment. You will be watching a training video
to help improve your ability to evaluate children’s testimonies. After about 50 minutes
of this you’ll have a com fort break and then will evaluate some children’s statements
on videotape and in written form. All the children were in an experiment. In the
statements the children will at some point accuse a research assistant of having taking a
book. Either this accusation is true, and they saw the researcher assistant steal the
book, or this is false. Your job will be to figure out which. Any questions? The
experiment will take a little less than three hours. If you know you can’t stay, we’d
like to ask that you leave now. Thanks for your time and help.”
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Q u estionn aire, A ll T estim on y C ond itions
(from vid eotap e statem ents first block)

C r e d ib il it y A sse ss m e n t R e s e a r c h

GENERAL DIRECTIONS:
Please put all your answers on the NCS Answer Sheet.
Be sure to check that you are filling in the “bubbles” in the correct places.
After a few minutes to answer general questions, you’ll see some videotapes and then read
some transcripts. Please evaluate each of the children’s statements separately from the others.

PLEASE DO NOT MAKE ANY MARKS ON THIS QUESTIONNAIRE O R ON THE
TRANSCRIPT PACKET WHICH WILL BE RE-USED.

OPTIONAL FO R SUBTECTS WISHING TO COMPETE FO R UP TO $100:
If you wish to be considered for the prize money, put your name on the form in the NAME
area, and put your telephone number in the ID EN TIFIC A TIO N N U M BER area (no spaces
or dashes). Be sure to fill in the corresponding bubbles. Your name will not be used in data
analysis other than to figure out if you’ve won the prizes for the most accurate responses (a
random draw will break any ties).

ALL SUBTECTS SHOULD ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS:

There are special areas on the left of the answer sheet for the answers to these three questions:
•
•
•

Fill in the circle for Sex
Fill in the circle for Grade (13-16, 16 for 5th year seniors, 0 if you are not an
undergraduate)
Fill in the circle for Birth Date
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The remaining questions are numbered from 1 and should be answered in the row on the
answer sheet with the same number. The letter designates which circle you should darken for a
particular response.

1.

Have you ever served on a jury?
A - Yes
B - No

2.

How many children do you have?
A
B
C
D
E

3.

0
1
2
3
more than 3

Please think about how many hours you’ve had in direct contact with children
between the ages of two and twelve. This would include baby sitting, taking care
of your own children, etc. Only count time spent with your own brothers and
sisters if you were at least fourteen when they were age 2-12.
A
B
C
D
E

4.

-

-

None
Less than 20 hours ever
Between 20 and 100 hours
Over 100 and less than 500 hours
Over 500 hours

Have you ever received training in assessing the credibility of children before?
A - Yes
B - No

5.

“A child makes an accusation about a crime to a police officer.” Which o n e of the
following statements b e s t describes your attitude to this situation?
A
B
C
D
E
F

-

Children will always tell the truth about serious matters
Children will usually tell the truth about serious matters
Children will sometimes tell the truth about serious matters
Children cannot be trusted about serious matters
It depends on the child
It depends on the situation

STOP.
The experimenter will soon show you videotaped statements and then printed statements for
you to evaluate quietly by yourself.
In each statement at some point a child will make an accusation about a research assistant
stealing a book. Either this is true (it really happened) or this is false (the research assistant
didn’t take the book). Remember to evaluate each statement separately, since you’ve been

assigned statements randomly and there is no fixed ratio of true and false statements!
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FIRST VIDEOTAPE
6.

In the videotape you’ve just watched, at some point a child said that a research
assistant stole someone’s textbook. Please evaluate the truthfulness of the child’s
accusation:
A - The child was being truthful, the
B - The child was lying and knows the
C - The child believed the researcher
researcher really didn't take the

7.

researcher took the book
researcher didn't take the book
took the book, but the
book

How confident are you in this evaluation?
A
B
C
D
E
F
G

-

Completely confident
Mostly confident
Somewhat confident
Fifty-fifty
Somewhat uncertain
Mostly uncertain
Completely uncertain

SECOND VIDEOTAPE
8.

In the videotape you’ve just watched, at some point a child said that a research
assistant stole someone’s textbook. Please evaluate the truthfulness of the child’s
accusation:
A - The child was being truthful, the
B - The child was lying and knows the
C - The child believed the researcher
researcher really didn't take the

9.

researcher took the book
researcher didn't take the book
took the book, but the
book

How confident are you in this evaluation?
A
B
C
D
E
F
G

-

Completely confident
Mostly confident
Somewhat confident
Fifty-fifty
Somewhat uncertain
Mostly uncertain
Completely uncertain

THIRD VIDEOTAPE
10.

In the videotape you’ve just watched, at some point a child said that a research
assistant stole someone’s textbook. Please evaluate the truthfulness of the child’s
accusation:
A - The child was being truthful, the
B - The child was lying and knows the
C - The child believed the researcher
researcher really didn't take the

11.

How confident are you in this evaluation?
A
B
C
D
E
F
G

-

Completely confident
Mostly confident
Somewhat confident
Fifty-fifty
Somewhat uncertain
Mostly uncertain
Completely uncertain

researcher took the book
researcher didn't take the book
took the book, but the
book
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FOURTH VIDEOTAPE
12.

In the videotape you’ve just watched, at some point a child said that a research
assistant stole someone’s textbook. Please evaluate the truthfulness of the child’s
accusation:
A - The child was being truthful, the
B - The child was lying and knows the
C - The child believed the researcher
researcher really didn't take the

13.

researcher took the book
researcher didn't take the book
took the book, but the
book

How confident are you in this evaluation?
A
B
C
D
E
F
G

-

Completely confident
Mostly confident
Somewhat confident
Fifty-fifty
Somewhat uncertain
Mostly uncertain
Completely uncertain

FIRST TRANSCRIPT
14.

In the transcript you’ve just read, at some point a c’ Id said that a research
assistant stole someone’s textbook. Please evaluate the truthfulness of the child’s
accusation:
A - The child was being truthful, the
B - The child was lying and knows the
C - The child believed the researcher
researcher really didn't take the

15.

researcher took the book
researcher didn't take the book
took the book, but the
book

How confident are you in this evaluation?
A
B
C
D
E
F
G

-

Completely confident
Mostly confident
Somewhat confident
Fifty-fifty
Somewhat uncertain
Mostly uncertain
Completely uncertain

SECOND TRANSCRIPT
16.

In the transcript you’ve just read, at some point a child said that a research
assistant stole someone’s textbook. Please evaluate the truthfulness of the child’s
accusation:
A - The child was being truthful, the
B - The child was lying and knows the
C - The child believed the researcher
researcher really didn't take the

17.

How confident are you in this evaluation?
A
B
C
D
E
F
G

-

Completely confident
Mostly confident
Somewhat confident
Fifty-fifty
Somewhat uncertain
Mostly uncertain
Completely uncertain

researcher took the book
researcher didn't take the book
took the book, but the
book
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THIRD TRANSCRIPT
18.

In the transcript you’ve just read, at some point a child said that a research
assistant stole someone’s textbook. Please evaluate the truthfulness of the child’s
accusation:
A - The child was being truthful, the
B - The child was lying and knows the
C - The child believed the researcher
researcher really didn't take the

19.

researcher took the book
researcher didn't take the book
took the book, but the
book

How confident are you in this evaluation?
A
B
C
D
E
F
G

-

Completely confident
Mostly confident
Somewhat confident
Fifty-fifty
Somewhat uncertain
Mostly uncertain
Completely uncertain

FOURTH TRANSCRIPT
20.

In the transcript you’ve just read, at some point a child said that a research
assistant stole someone’s textbook. Please evaluate the truthfulness of the child’s
accusation:
A - The child was being truthful, the
B - The child was lying and knows the
C - The child believed the researcher
researcher really didn't take the

21.

researcher took the book
researcher didn't take the book
took the book, but the
book

How confident are you in this evaluation?
A
B
C
D
E
F
G

-

Completely confident
Mostly confident
Somewhat confident
Fifty-fifty
Somewhat uncertain
Mostly uncertain
Completely uncertain

STOP.
Please wait quietly for the experimenter to hand you the final questionnaire.
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Fin al Q u estionn aire, C BC A and
C ou nter-C B C A C ond itions
Please put vour name here:_______________________ ____________
P L E A S E A N S W E R #22-26

22.

t h is w il l o n l y be u se d to m a t c h t h is p a g e w it h y o u r S c a n t r o n

ON THE NCS FORM B Y F IL L IN G

IN T H E C IR C L E S ...

Which made your evaluations of the children’s truthfulness easier?
A - it was easier to figure out from the printed statements
B - it was easier to figure out from the videos
C - they were about the same

23.

How did CBCA training affect your ability to evaluate the children’s statements?
A
B
C
D
E
F
G

24.

B
C
D
E
F
G

-

very competent
somewhat competent
a little competent
neither competent nor incompetent
a little incompetent
somewhat incompetent
very incompetent

How convincing was Dr. Honts?
A

B
C
D
E
F
G

26.

It helped tremendously
It helped a lot
It helped a little
It neither helped nor hurt
It hurt a little
It hurt a lot
It hurt tremendously

How competent was Dr. Honts?
A

25.

-

-

very convincing
somewhat convincing
a little convincing
neither convincing nor unconvincing
a little unconvincing
somewhat unconvincing
very unconvincing

The presence in a statement of CBCA criteria suggests that...
- The statement is most likely true
B - The statement is most likely false

A

A N S W E R T H E F O L L O W IN G B Y W R IT IN G O N

THIS PAGE IN T H E

S P A C E B E L O W ...

Have you had any prior exposure to this research, or has anyone talked about it with you?
Please circle one: Yes / No
If yes, we’d appreciate you letting us know what you’ve already heard before the experiment began:

Please turn this form over and answer the questions on the other side. T h a n k y o u .

Below, write down as many of the criteria as you can remember:

Please use the space below to write down any comments you may have about the research.
We’re especially interested in any other techniques you may have used to figure out which
children were telling the truth. Thanks again for your time.

145

Final Q u estionnaire,
N o T estim on y C ond ition

Please put vour name here:

ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTION

22.

t h is w i l l o n l y b e u se d t o m a t c h th is p a g e w it h y o u r S c a n t r o n

ON THE NCS FORM...

Which made your evaluations of the children’s truthfulness easier?
A - it was easier to figure out from the printed statements
B - it was easier to figure out from the videos
C - they were about the same

A N S W E R T H E F O L L O W IN G B Y W R IT IN G O N

THIS PAGE

IN T H E S P A C E B E L O W ...

Have you had any prior exposure to this research, or has anyone talked about it with you?
Please circle one:

Yes / No

If yes, we’d appreciate you letting us know what you’ve already heard before the experiment
began:

Please use the space below to write down any comments you may have about the
research. W e’re especially interested in any other techniques you may have used to figure
out which children were telling the truth. Thanks again for your time.

APPENDIX D: RESAMPLING STATISTICS

R esam pling offers a v ariety of statistical tools w hich are com plem entary
to the trad ition al tests em ployed by researchers. This b rief in trod u ction to
resam pling m akes reference to the tests conducted in the p resent study.
Follow ing this introduction are sam ple program s executed to find bootstrap
probabilities reported on in the R esults chapter.
O ne w ay o f testing w heth er tw o observed frequencies differ significantly
w ould b e to perform a probability calculation, like the nonparam etric
B IN O M IA L procedu re in SP SS (com paring to a pop ulation w ith a m ean
frequ ency o f .5). R esam pling is analogous, but instead o f calculating a probability
u sing a form ula, one finds it "exp erim en tally " b y cond ucting a M onte C arlo
sim ulation. R esam pling involves com bining actual experim ental groups into a
single vector— saying that all observations com e from the sam e pop ulation is a
restatem en t o f the null hypothesis that treatm ents have no effect on the group
m eans— and th en creating new experim ental "o b serv atio n s" from this vector.
The statistic o f in terest is calculated for these new observations (such as a
difference betw een m eans), and this is stored. The process is repeated several
hu nd red tim es, b u ild ing up a sam pling distribu tion o f the statistic o f interest.
A fter this, one exam ines w here the actual exp erim ental valu e o f the statistic falls
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in the sam p ling distribu tion, and this indicates the (bootstrap) p robability of
having found results that or m ore extrem e u nder assum ption that the null
hypoth esis is true (Sim on, 1992).
U sing resam pling to ask w hether an observed frequency differs from
chance requires generating a vector o f rand om num bers distributed as one
w ould expect u nd er the null (e.g., 50% 0 's and 50% l's ). R esam pling m akes it
easy to directly com pare tw o frequencies w hich result from different nu m bers of
observations, w ithout having to use interm ediate statistics such as F ish er's Z '
(Sim on, 1992). It also m akes it possible to find the pow er of a particu lar
experim ental design.
G en erally, 1,000 trials is satisfactory. M ore trials results in a sm oother
distribution, b u t the in crem ental gain w ith each additional trial (in term s of
im proving closeness o f fit to a m athem atically exact probability) becom es ever
sm aller (Sim on, 1992). The resam pled probability thus derived w ill b e v ery close
to an exact probability (such as a Fish er's Exact Test), if a form ula exists to
calculate one. W hen no form ula exists, resam pling offers the only w ay of
calculating statistical significance.
Thus, an advantage of resam pling for the present study is that it allow s
d irect com p arisons o f frequencies w ith different n (e.g., com paring 65% o f 1000
lay evalu ation s correct w ith 89% o f 28 expert C BC A evaluations). A lth ou gh this
is a sim ple question, conventional statistics do not readily apply to such a
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situation. O n e cou ld use an A N O V A , b u t the data are nonparam etric (violating
an assum ption of A N O V A ), and furtherm ore, A N O V A m ay be biased w ith
vastly u nequal n. O n e m ight also use F ish er's Z ' to com pare tw o correlations
based on different group sizes, how ever, Fish er's Z ' w orks w ith interm ediate
valu es (com paring tw o correlations) and is neither conceptu ally nor num erically
sim ple to apply. A lso, correlations again m ake assum ptions about the underlying
d istribu tion o f the pop ulation, w hich m ay not be true for the p resent data.
R esam pling does not rely on any theoretical (underlying) distribution. By
definition, it creates the null-hypothesis distribution given the data (w hich,
u nder the null, com e from the sam e population). By definition it is free from
concerns about departing from an assum ed pop ulation distribution, unlike
p robability tests (Sim on, 1992). Fu rtherm ore, resam pling allow s questions to be
answ ered that w ould be difficult to address w ith conventional statistics, or
w ould require the m isapplication of conventional statistics. In conclusion, as
Sim on (1992) notes, resam pling statistics should be view ed as com plem en tary to
conven tion al techniques.
F o r the p resent research, resam pling w as used to cond uct a p ow er
analysis (reported in the M ethod chapter). It w as also used in com paring
d ifferen tial evalu ation perform ance (reported in the R esults chapter). T he rest of
this ap p en d ix contains resam pling program s w ritten b y the au thor in the
R esam plin g Stats language, w hich is a sim ple program m ing lan guage designed
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to constru ct resam pling-style M onte C arlo analyses. The program s have been
annotated to explain the function o f the code and the program . T able 14 in the
R esu lts chapter com pares differential evalu ation perform ance to chance.
Follow ing the program s is a list of the actual ratios (observed values) that w ere
resam pled to d eterm ine these bootstrap probabilities.
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Program to calculate a sampling distribution for the number correct under
under chance conditions. Then finds the mean and standard deviation of
this sampling distribution, and calculates number correct for z=1.65
1 (one-tailed p<.05) (training condition, 1260 evaluations). [DISSPWR1.STA]
' equal to .1 correlation, 1* of variance, performance of 55* correct in
' experimental hypothesis population (vs. 50* correct under chance in null
' hypothesis population). 1260 evals = medium effect with 15 Ss per group
' and 55* of 1260 is 693.
’ (4 evals per medium * 7 groups * 3 training conditions * 15 Ss/run = 1260)
' (8 evals per training cond x 7 groups x 15 Ss/run = 840 for main eff. train)
’ (and 50* of main eff. training for interaction, 420 and 55* of 420)

MAXSIZE DEFAULT 10000
REPEAT 10000

GENERATE 1260 0,1 A
COUNT A = 1 B
SCORE B Z

' generate 1260 random integers 0 or 1
' count how many l's (correct), put into B
' Z will be a sampling dist. of # correct

END

MEAN Z M
SI
i s

find mean of sampling distribution
find standard deviation of sampling distribution

MULTIPLY S 1.65 A
ADD A M C

one-tailed p<.05, z=1.65

PRINT M S
PRINT C

’ bootstrapped # correct by chance at .05 1-tail limit

' any more than this correct by chance would be significant at p<.05
' level (one-tailed). This came to 659 under when the program was run
’ (mean 630, SD 17.771, 1.65 SD is 1-tailed z of .05)

151
Program to calculate power of finding significance for training condition
if effect accounts for IX of variance in criterion (.1 correlation, or
a performance of 55# correct). [DISSPWR2.STA]
' This uses sampling distribution of program DISSPWR1, which for 1260
' evaluations yielded 659 as the .05 cutoff (if more than 659 of 1260 are
' correct, p<.05 for getting results that or more extreme if the null
’ hypothesis is true).

MAXSIZE DEFAULT 1500
GENERATE 55 1 A
GENERATE 45 0 B
CONCAT A B C

' Experimental Hypothesis population, 55£ correct

REPEAT 1000
SAMPLE 1260 C D
COUNT D =1 E
SCORE E Z

' generate a sample
' count how many correct
' create a sampling distribution of number correct

END
COUNT Z >= 659 X

'
'
'
'
'

given the experimental hypothesis (population
is 55* correct), count number of times a result
was found that was equal or more extreme than
the number correct that would be found at the .05
level given the null hypothesis

DIVIDE X 1000 Y

' express as a proportion

PRINT Y

' this is the bootstrap power

7.52
'Program which compares an outcome to chance.
'This program calculates the probability of getting >= a particular number
’of observations correct under the assumption that the null hypothesis
’is true (i.e. that the population from which the group came is
'one in which performance is at 502 correct, i.e. chance level).

MAXSIZE DEFAULT 5000 Z 11000

GENERATE 5000 0,1 A
SHUFFLE A A

'make a large vector of random observations
'shuffle for good measure!

REPEAT 10000
'sample to however many actual observations there were (here, 2664)
SAMPLE 2664 A K
COUNT K = 1 KK
SCORE KK Z

'sample with replacement to make an experimental "run"
'count number correct that was observed that run
'preserve this across iterations, this will accumulate
'to form a sampling distribution under the null

END

'set this equal to actual number correct
COUNT Z >= 1731 ZZ

'count number of times a result e q u a l to or greater than
'that which was actually observed was obtained in the
'10,000 Monte C a r l o trials (here, 652 correct)
'this would be <= 1731 if we were looking for
'performance being worse than chance

DIVIDE ZZ 10000 P

'express as a proportion (probability)

PRINT P

'actual probability
'of having obtained
'than were actually
'(here, one tailed:
'

given the null (chance performance)
results equal to or more extreme
observed (one-tailed)
considering better than chance
OR worse than chance only)
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'Resampling program to compare any two frequencies/proportions correct.
'Program to calculate probability of finding a proportion correct
'that or more extreme than the one actually observed, given the
'null hypothesis that the observed group comes from the same
'population as a comparison group.
'Comparison group can chance (equal numbers right and wrong),
'or the numbers right and wrong in another experimental condition.
'BENEFIT OF RESAMPLING: Number of evaluations in the two groups may
'
be dissimilar and comparison is still valid.
'This example will compare observation of 65* of 2664 evaluations correct,
'with a second observation of 90* of 28 evaluations correct.

MAXSIZE DEFAULT 3000 C 5500 Z 12000
'A1 (A2) -- observed number correct (incorrect) for group A
SET 1732 1 A1
SET 932 0 A2
CONCAT A1 A2 A
SHUFFLE A A

'generate observed number correct (2664*.65)
'generate observed number incorrect (2664-1732)
'pull together: A has actual data from first group

'B1 (B2) -- observed number correct (incorrect) for group B
SET
25 1 B1
SET
3 0 B2
CONCAT B1 B2 B
SHUFFLE B B

'observed number correct (28*.9)
'observed number incorrect (28-25)
'actual data from second group

CONCAT A B C
SHUFFLE C C

'under null, both groups come from same population
'shuffle again for good measure!

(continued on next page)
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REPEAT 10000

'we will pretend we had run the experiment 10,000 times

'sample & divide by same number as total observations in group A
SAMPLE 2664 C K 'a single Monte Carlo run for first group
COUNT K = 1 K1
'count how many were observed to be correct
DIVIDE K1 2664 KK 'express # right as a proportion
'(so we can compare with 2nd group)

'ditto for total observations in group B
SAMPLE
28 C L 'a single Monte Carlo run for the second group
COUNT L = 1 LI
'count how many were observed to be correct
DIVIDE LI
28 LL 'express # right as a proportion
’(so we can compare with 1st group)
SUMABSDEV KK LL J 'express difference between 1st and 2nd group's proportions
'as an absolute deviation (absolute value = 2 tailed)
'(2-tailed because 1st could be > 2nd or vice-versa)
SCORE J Z

'Z will accumulate this difference, building our sampling
'distribution of differences for our 10,000 "experiments"

END

'use difference in observed proportions:
' ( [observed correct in A]/[total in A] ) - (ObsCorrB/TotalB)

COUNT Z >= .25 ZZ

'how often in the sampling distribution we observed a
'difference in proportion greater than or equal to the
'actual observed difference
'(.65-.9=.25, also 1731.6/2664 - 25.2/28 = .25)

DIVIDE ZZ 10000 P

'proportion (probability or p value) of times we observed it

PRINT P

'p value of obtaining a difference between the two groups
'equal to or more extreme than what we actually observed
'given the null is true and the two groups come from the
'same population

Actual Ratios Compared (Observed Values) for Resampled Bootstrap
Probabilities of Evaluations-Compared-to-Chance Reported on in Results

ST A T EM EN T S
% correct
exact ratio resam pled (observed
frequencies)

A ll

True

False

Lay E valu ators, N o Training

65%
645/1000

63%
278/440

66%
367/560

Lay Evalu ators, C BC A Training

63%
487/768

64%
211/328

63%
276/440

Lay E valu ators, C ou nter Training

59%
529/896

47%
173/372

68%
356/524

Exp ert C BC A , D iscrim inant A nalysis

89%
25/28

75%
9/12

100%
16/16

E xp ert C BC A , Jackknifed Disc. A nalysis

71%
20/28

58%
7/12

81%
13/16

Exp ert C BC A , Logistic R egression

86%
24/28

83%
10/12

88%
14/16

Exp ert C BC A , Jackknifed Log. R egression

79%
22/28

67%
8/12

88%
14/16

E V A LU A T IO N

The child’s statement in Appendix A is from a Fantasy Accusation condition, and is false.
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